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CONNIE

M.

FRIESEN*

The Regulation and Supervision of
International Lending: Part I
Introduction
Beginning with a brief overview of the importance of bank regulation and
supervision' for prudent international lending by commercial banks and
long-term resolution of the LDC debt crisis, 2 this analysis proceeds to a

comparison of selected bank regulatory and supervisory practices in several
major creditor countries. It then turns to questions of appropriate reforms in
domestic bank regulation and improved regulatory coordination among the
major creditor countries as well as a greater role for international supervisory agencies.
I. The Regulation and Supervision of International Lending

A.

THE ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY DIMENSIONS
OF THE LDC DEBT CRISIS

Over thirty developing countries (LDCs) completed or were engaged in
*B.A. Concordia College, 1967; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1972; J.D., Yale University,
1978. Member, New York and Connecticut Bars. Research for this article was supported by a
grant from The Rockefeller Foundation.
1. There is a traditional distinction between "regulation" and "supervision." Regulation
consists of authoritative rules or principles dealing with details of procedure. WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1913 (1968, unabridged). One
thoughtful definition states that "regulation is the public administrative policing of a private
activity with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest." B. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REGULATION 7 (1980). Supervision is a more general oversight, critical evaluation
or direction with authority. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra, at 2296.
The authors of a recent government report stated that, "Regulations implement laws that
govern the types of services organizations can provide. Supervision . . . involves the direct
assessment of operations to determine how adequate or safe they are." J. Hou'r &
M. MARTINSON, FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES OF U.S. BANKING ORGANIZATIONS, BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, STAFF STUDY No. 120 (Oct. 1982), at 14.

2. The terms "LDC debt crisis" and "global debt crisis" are often used interchangeably.
Because this analysis deals with bank regulation and supervision primarily in the context of
developing countries, the term "LDC debt crisis" is used throughout.
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debt reschedulings during 1984. 3 The total debt of these economically
troubled countries was approximately $400 billion at the end of 1984, or
more than half of the total estimated LDC debt of close to $700 billion. 4 An
additional $100 billion of LDC debt is expected to come due between 1985
and 1987.
Precise numerical figures about the extent of the LDC debt crisis are
difficult to obtain. However, figures of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) indicate that between 1970
and 1984 the outstanding medium and long-term debt of developing countries expanded almost tenfold, to $686 billion. In the World Bank's view,
"[tihe most striking feature of this growth was the surge in lending by
commercial banks. Their share of total new flows to developing countries
increased from 15 percent in 1970 to 36 percent in 1983." The World Bank
concluded that "on every measure, the debt-servicing abilities of the developing countries deteriorated ... as their debt increased." '5 The World
Bank's figures indicate that:
The ratio of debt to GNP more than doubled, from 14 percent in 1970 to almost 34
percent in 1984. The ratio of debt service to exports rose from 14.7 percent in 1970
to a peak of 20.5 percent in 1982, declining to 19.7 percent in 1984. Interest
payments on debt increased from 0.5 percent of GNP in 1970 to 2.8 percent of
GNP 6in 1984 and accounted for more than half of all debt service payments in that
year.

Such facts prompted former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to remark
that, "[debt payments of such magnitude] simply cannot be made. None of
the major debtor countries will be able simultaneously to pay its debts,
achieve economic growth and maintain its political and social equilibrium," 7
The origins of the LDC debt crisis are often attributed to problems of
recycling oil-related funds following the oil shocks of the 1970s. Former
Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan has commented that, "the present
troubled state of the world economy has its roots in the emerging inflationary pressures of the late 1960s, the twin oil shocks of the 1970s and policy
responses that attempted to avoid adjustment to new economic realities. "8
3. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, at 4 (Figure 1.3) (1985).
4. WORLD BANK, Net Capital Flows and Debt, 1975-84, id. at 2, (Figure 1.1).
5. Id.
6. Id. These averages conceal wide regional and country differences. For example, in
Argentina in 1982, debt service as a percentage of exports was 102.9 percent. W. R. CLINE,
INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE, at Statistical App., Table E-2
(1984).
7. Kissinger, West Must Move to Ease Debt Crisis in Latin America, L.A. Times, June 24,
1984, at 1 (available on NEXIS).
8. Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, testimony before the House Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, H.R. REP. No. 175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1982)
(testimony of Sec. of Treas. Donald Regan), Report accompanying H.R. 2957, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., (1983) [hereinafter cited as REP 98-175]. For an early statement of this argument, see
VOL. 19, NO. 4
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The economic causes of the current LDC debt crisis have also been
assessed in depth by the IMF, the Bank for International Settlements (the
BIS) and the World Bank. The World Bank has observed that "the much
publicized debt difficulties of the past two years came to a head because of
the unusual combination in 1980-1983 of recession and high real interest
rates in the industrial countries." 9 Moreover, in the World Bank's view,
developing countries have become more vulnerable to debt-servicing difficulties in the 1980s for three related reasons. First, loans have far outstripped equity finance. Second, the proportion of floating interest rate debt
has risen dramatically. Third, loan maturities have shortened considerably,
to a large extent because of the declining share of official capital flows and
debt. 10 The IMF has emphasized that the recent difficult phase in the debt
crisis could be traced to declining output in industrial countries and the
corresponding interruption in world trade patterns. 1 The BIS has viewed
the debt problem as one consequence
of the transition from inflation to
12
disinflation in the world economy.
As central as they are to an understanding of the debt crisis, economic
factors should not be considered in isolation. While the principal cause of
the debt crisis is surely to be found in the economic factors referred to above,
there remains the question of whether bank regulators and supervisors
should have had greater foresight in anticipating these unprecedented economic developments. One observer has spoken of the "regulatory free-forall [that] has contributed to the very grave crisis now engulfing the international banking system."' 13 Another has argued that, "[miany of the critical
risks now faced by the international financial system are directly attributable
to .. .failures of the present scheme of bank regulation.' 14 A third has
declared that, "[w]e are faced with the worldwide over-commitment of an
interlocking banking system and potential default on a scale that could
15
exceed the entire capital and reserves of the world's most famous banks."
K. Farmanfarmaian, How Can the World Afford OPECOil?, 51 FOR. AFF. 201 (1975). For an
opposing viewpoint, see T. ENDERS and R. MATrIONE, LATIN AMERICA: THE CRISIS OF DEBT AND
GROWTH 3 (1984).
9. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
10. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
11. IMF, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 1-2 (1983); see also W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE
STABILITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, 13-31 (1983).
12. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, at 8-18 (1983).
13. Statement ofDr. Richard S. Dale at Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Sept. 17, 1982, cited in Crime and
Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, Staff Study made by the Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,
Print No. 98-21, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 21 (1983).
14. M. Cohen, U.S. Regulation of Bank Lending to LDCs: Balancing Bank Overexposure
and Credit Undersupply, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD., 200, 212 (1982).

15. Lord Lever, The Road to Solvency, Wall St. J., June 7, 1984, at 23.
FALL 1985
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The time has come to supplement analysis of the economic causes of the
LDC debt crisis with a focus on its bank regulatory and supervisory aspects.
W. P. Cooke, head of banking supervision at the Bank of England, has
questioned whether the current crisis "may not point increasingly toward a
need for a single global regulatory framework within which banks should
conduct their international business." 16 Built on shared expectations rather
than extensive formal structures, Cooke's "framework" would be supported by domestic bank supervisors and regulators working to reconcile the
nuances and facilitate the achievement of these common objectives. Cooke
has suggested that such a framework "should be capable of withstanding
shocks, with an in-built resilience, but at the same time containing rules,
in the areas of capital adequacy,
yardsticks, guidelines . . . for example,
17

liquidity and concentrations of risk.'
The ad hoc nature of current regulatory and supervisory procedures and
the lack of full agreement on objectives among bank regulatory and supervisory agencies represent one regulatory aspect of the problem. However,
even when governments have developed programs for regulatory guidance
of international lending and banking practices, such programs have often
had the unintended consequence of encouraging misdirected lending patterns. At least one observer has spoken of "how the increase in government
involvement itself contributed to the banking crisis. '18 Government loan
guarantees provided by agencies such as the Export-Import Bank in the
United States and government involvement through agencies such as the
IMF and the World Bank have encouraged lending patterns to develop in
particular ways that sometimes seem wrong in retrospect. At times, large
industrial complexes have been favored at the expense of the development
of agriculture. In addition, short-term lending to developing countries has at
times been encouraged by bank examiners because it contributes to the
flexibility of a commercial bank's liquidity position. But short-term lending
also increases the vulnerability of the banking system as a whole to sudden
contractions of capital.' 9
The meetings of central bankers held in New York in early May 1984 at
the invitation of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York highlighted the role
of bank regulators and supervisors in resolving the LDC debt crisis. The
discussions revealed a growing belief that the often ad hoc strategy which
bank supervisory agencies and commercial banks in the leading creditor
16. Paper prepared for Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference on LDC Finance by
W. P. Cooke, LDC Finance-The Role of Bank Supervisory Policies, New York, May 6-9,
1984, at 1.
17. Id. at 2.
18. E. Folkerts-Landau, The Regulatory Origins of the International Debt Crisis, THE
BANKERS MAGAZINE,

44 (Sept.-Oct. 1984).

19. Testimony by Richard Dale before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, Feb. 9, 1983.
VOL. 19, NO. 4
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countries had utilized since 1982 could not be relied upon to work in view of
volatile interest rates which could increase the cost of variable rate loans, a
growing reluctance among borrowers such as Argentina and Brazil to accept
economic austerity programs imposed by the IMF as the price of new
lending, and a general crisis of confidence in the international banking
system. 20
Perhaps for the first time, there is a consensus among bank regulators and
supervisors and commercial banks in creditor countries that basic reforms in
domestic and international supervision and regulation of the international
lending practices of commercial banks are needed. 21 There is a recognition
that "a banking system that is constantly on the brink of disaster and subject
'22
to never-ending threats of default does not inspire confidence."
Moreover, as part of a continuing effort dating back to the establishment
of the Cooke Committee in 1975, domestic bank supervisors have increasingly worked towards consolidated supervision of commercial bank
lending practices. In doing so, they have given greater attention to problems
arising from offshore banking centers and the interbank market. Offshore
banking centers generally provide only minimal constraints on bank subsidiaries and branches within their jurisdiction. 23 The international interbank market, in which banks lend to one another, now has an estimated
worth of $1,000 billion and has been described as the "powerhouse of
international lending."' 24 Yet, "paradoxically for a market which is so central to the operation of the international banking system, it has thrived and
prospered on an unregulated basis." 25
The new focus on reform in the regulation and supervision of commercial
banks' international activities is understandable and overdue, since international lending developed rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s with little
20. The so-called "10-Point Program" on economic performance, issued at the conclusion of
the June 1984 London summit meeting, affirmed an ad hoc case-by-case strategy in dealing with
international debt problems. London Summit Produces10-Point Programon Economic Performance, [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 42, at 1034 (June 18, 1984). A separate
statement by the finance ministers of the seven summit nations focused on greater contributions
(including regulatory steps) that could be made by the World Bank and other international
organizations. Summit ParticipantsBack Multiyear Financing, Other Improvements, [Jan.June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 42, at 1035 (June 18, 1984).
21. R. WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS, 1983,
IMF Occasional Paper No. 23, at 15 (July 1983) (supervisory officials in creditor countries
concerned about extent of general deterioration in quality of banks' international assets and
effect this has on strength of major banks and stability of international financial system).
22. REP. 98-175, supra note 8, at 22.
23. G. Powell, Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, 8 ISSUES INBANK REGULATION 11,
12-14 (1984).
24. Montagnon, Interbank Market: InternationalPowerhouse, Fin. Times, May 21,1984, pt.
1, at 6.
25. Id.; see generally J. GUTrENTAG & R. HERRING, PRUDENTIAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTERBANK MARKET (1984).
FALL 1985
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corresponding growth in domestic or international bank regulation and
supervision. As one report noted, "[t]he rise in multinational banking and
the increased importance of liability management in international finance
had also greatly increased the integration of the world's financial system, but
national regulators had as yet devoted
little attention to increased interna26
tional regulatory cooperation.",
In part, the new emphasis on regulation and supervision is a reflection of a
growing disenchantment with the unevenness of rules and restraints imposed by bank supervisors in major creditor countries and a recognition that
new patterns of regulation and supervision creating shared expectations and
facilitating systematic stability will be needed. 27
B.

THE OBJECTiVES OF REGULATORY REFORM

Domestic bank supervisory policies that will promote disclosure of international lending practices and exposures, enhance the safety and soundness
of the international banking system, encourage competition among major28
commercial banks and facilitate global economic growth are desirable.
While disclosure, confidence and competition are all important independent
objectives of regulatory reform, the relationship among them must also
be considered. Moreover, while the bank supervisory
process must be
29
strengthened, it must also be made more flexible.
Disclosure of pertinent information about international lending should be
tempered by a recognition that too much disclosure may sometimes conflict
with prudential concerns. As E. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, has stated: "We cannot allow the legitimate
demand for disclosure and market discipline to overwhelm the integrity of
the process whereby banks and their supervisors can freely go about the
business of solving problems.", 30 Competition among commercial banks,
both domestically and internationally, must be linked with a recognition
that the integrity of the international banking system and public confidence
26. G.

JOHNSON &

R.

ABRAMS, ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SAFETY NET,

IMF,

OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 17, at 24 (Mar. 1983).
27. See, e.g., Cline, supra note 11, at 98. Cline observes that "the basic problem regulatory
reform needs to address is the overextension of sovereign lending beyond limits that are
prudent for the system."
28. Historically, the broad goals of U.S. banking regulation and supervision have reflected
some of these objectives. These goals have included insuring the stability of the banking system,
protecting individual depositors and fostering competition among banks. HousE COMM. ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG.,

1ST SESS.,

THE OPERATIONS OF U.S.

BANKS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, 25 (1979).

29. Remarks of E. Gerald Corrigan, 57th Annual Mid-Winter Meeting of the New York
State Bankers Association (Jan. 31, 1985), reprinted in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
QUARTERLY REVIEW 4 (Spring 1985) [hereinafter FRBNY 0. REV.]

30. Id.
VOL. 19, NO. 4
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in it may at a particular time supersede competitive goals. Finally, the
potentially heavy hand of regulators should not be allowed to interfere in a
fundamental way with the flows of capital that provide the impetus for global
economic growth.
More uniform guidelines for domestic bank regulation and supervision of
international lending practices would be helpful aids to coordination and
cooperation among domestic bank regulatory systems. They would provide
a constructive background for greater international cooperation. A report
of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs was
unequivocal on this point: "If the [domestic] bank regulatory agencies
around the world are not able to cooperate and coordinate their actions, it is
difficult to imagine how the present debt problem can be solved or similar
problems prevented from arising again in the future."31
C.

COMMON THEMES IN THE DOMESTIC SUPERVISION OF

INTERNATIONAL LENDING

While current regulatory systems vary considerably, it is possible to
isolate some common themes among the major creditor countries. Thus,
domestic approaches to the LDC debt crisis will be analyzed in terms of the
following basic areas: (1) The relationship between government and central
bank controls; (2) accounting and disclosure rules; (3) general rules for the
prudent conduct of a banking business, including limits on loans to single
borrowers, capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, and foreign exchange
restrictions; (4) specific rules for international lending, including country
risk analysis and provisions for loan losses, lender of last resort functions,
control over foreign branches and subsidiaries of domestic banks and controls on foreign banks operating domestically; and (5) attitudes towards
international cooperation.
D.

INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OF LENDING PRACTICES

Beyond the development of more uniform domestic regulatory goals and
greater cooperation among domestic regulatory agencies, there remains the
question of what role, if any, should be played in the regulatory process by
international agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank. Should these
agencies, which have thus far been assigned functions which are primarily
related to capital flows between developed and developing countries be
given a supervisory role as well? Should the BIS be given supervisory
functions in addition to its primary role as banker for central banks?
At present, the guiding document for international supervision of lending

31. REP. 98-175, supra note 8, at 42.
FALL 1985
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practices is the Basle Concordat. 32 This is a guide for allocation of supervisory responsibility and greater cooperation among domestic bank regulatory agencies rather than a format for supranational supervision. 33 As
written in 1975, the Basle Concordat assigned supervisory authority for
subsidiaries of foreign banks to central banks of host countries. In 1983, the
Basle Concordat was updated to clarify that both host country and parent
country central banks jointly shared responsibility for supervision of
branches and subsidiaries with respect to liquidity. As to solvency matters,
branches were to be supervised by parent country central banks while joint
parent-host country supervision was to apply to subsidiaries.
In one respect, the Basle Concordat, which does not look beyond the
host-parent dichotomy for a possible international regulatory or supervisory
solution, is evidence of a tension between domestic and international supervisory levels that cannot be overcome. In the absence of authoritative
enforcement mechanisms, the international level must remain one of cooperation and coordination. Yet the question remains whether that cooperative and coordinating role can best be developed by the joint efforts of
domestic bank supervisory and regulatory authorities or whether there is a
viable but as yet undeveloped regulatory role that might usefully be assumed
by the BIS, the World Bank and the IMF.

E. A

CAVEAT: BANK REGULATION AND WORLD ECONOMIC RECOVERY

While enlightened bank regulation and supervision can help achieve the
objectives of stability and growth in the international financial markets,
even carefully designed regulatory systems cannot insure that there will be
no future threats to the liquidity or solvency of commercial banks from
international lending. The simple fact is that "bank regulation cannot avert
or solve worldwide economic problems ....Furthermore,
bank regulation
' 34
is not intended to replace bank management.

32. Basle Concordat, 1975 (reprinted in R. WILLIAMS INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS, IMF OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 7 (1981)),

and Basle Concordat, 1983 (revised version) (COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND
SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS' FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS

(March 1983). Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all references to the Basle Concordat are to
the revised 1983 version.
33. Some observers have been highly critical of the so-called "Cooke Committee," an
informal adjunct of the HIS which produced the Basle Concordat: "The [Cooke] Committee
meets in secret and its deliberations are confidential. Moreover, what little is known of the
[Cooke] Committee's decisions suggests something quite different from a unified international
perspective." REP. 98-175, supra note 8, at 43.
34. InternationalLending, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions Supervision, Regulation and Insuranceof the House Comm. on Banking, Financeand Urban Affairs,

98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as REP. 98-16].
VOL. 19, NO. 4
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Nor can changes in bank supervisory practices affect borrowers' needs for
funds. 35 Worldwide economic growth and recovery would clearly help to
alleviate the LDC debt crisis by reducing the need for borrowing and much
attention has been focused on ways to achieve that goal. 36 The 1983 annual
report of the World Bank concluded, for example, that:
What is needed for sustained world economic growth is concerted action by both
the industrial and the developing countries. The former to help provide a more
stable and favorable external economic environment through steady but noninflationary expansion, a more open trading system, and continued steady growth in
both commercial and concessionary
capital flows. The latter, by adopting policies
37
that increase efficiency.
However, while a continued decline in United States interest rates,38
coupled with strong economic growth in the debtor countries, higher commodities prices and a general expansion of trade between debtor and creditor countries would ease the LDC debt crisis, growth without accompanying
development of new patterns of supervision and regulation of international
39
lending would provide only a temporary and illusory "solution."
Another problem with economic solutions is that they do not adequately
address the short-term aspects of the international lending crisis. In the
short run, governments must play a role in maintaining capital flows to
debtor countries, reducing the burden of interest payments and stemming
the rise of protectionism. 40 At present, the most meaningful key to a
solution to the debt crisis is the restoration of confidence and stability to the
international banking system. A focus on increased trade and economic
growth will not directly affect the size, repayment terms or continuation of
loans from creditor to debtor countries. Governments must create systems
of banking supervision and regulation that promote the safety and soundness of banks while facilitating continued flows of credit from creditor to
debtor countries.

35. J. GUTTENTAG & R. HERRING, supra note 25, at 28.

36. There has been an interesting debate among economists as to whether a reduction in
interest rates or a surge in general economic growth in the industrialized world would more
quickly ease the debt burden.
37. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 26 (1983). A similar emphasis can be found
in IMF, supra note 11, at 1-2. The IMF report also expressed concern about the "efficiency" of
efforts to promote economic growth in developing countries. Id. at 42.
38. BIS, supra note 12, at 181: "From every conceivable angle, the most important and most
urgent task for policy is to exert downward pressure on U.S. interest rates."
39. It is interesting to note that even among West European commercial bankers who have
long tended to view high U.S. interest rates as a major cause of the debt crisis, there is growing
sentiment in favor of closer cooperation among domestic supervisors and enhanced roles for
international supervisory agencies.
40. Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Latin American Debt: Act Two, 62 FOR. AFF. 30 (1983).
FALL 1985
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II. Bank Regulation and Supervision in the United States
A.

GENERALLY

The United States approach to supervision of international lending by
commercial banks has been marked by frequent confrontation between the
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board (the FRB) over the
appropriate level of funding for international agencies such as the IMF and
the World Bank as well as the adequacy of current rules governing international lending practices of commercial banks. The Comptroller of the Currency (the Comptroller) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(the FDIC) have also made numerous statements on various aspects of the
LDC debt crisis. Even within the FRB, there has apparently been a debate
over the efficacy of current structures for dealing with debt rescheduling and
other matters relating to the LDC debt crisis. FRB Chairman Volcker has
stated his opposition to global supervisory solutions or negotiations between
creditor and debtor countries because "we already have a process that seems
to work." Vice Chairman Preston Martin, on the other hand, has been a
proponent of a more activist approach to bank supervision and the debt
crisis. 4 '
An adversarial tone has entered into relations between commercial banks
and their primary federal regulators on matters relating to disclosure of
foreign loans and development of more stringent capital adequacy requirements. Commercial banks have appeared reluctant to discuss problems of
interpretation and application of rules with their regulators and are clearly
eager to make new rules on international lending apply to them as modestly
and narrowly as possible. 42 There is, at present, no uniform set of guidelines
or regulations that applies consistently to commercial banks engaged in
lending to developing countries.4 3
1. The Dual Banking System
Historically, banks in the United States have been able to choose between
41. D. Gardner, Volcker "Wary" of MultilateralDebt Talks, Fin. Times, Apr. 29, 1985, at 2;
R. Bennett, Volcker Rebukes Martin on Third World Debt Ideas, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1985
at D3.
42. A number of commentators have referred to the "formal and legalistic character" of
banking regulation and supervision in the United States. See, e.g., A. SPINDLER, THE POLITICS
OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT: PRIVATE FINANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY IN GERMANY AND JAPAN 191
(1984) [hereinafter cited as SPINDLER]. It is commonly acknowledged that a complex regulatory
structure has helped to insulate the banking system from "executive interference and discretion." Id. But a corollary has been the development of equally elaborate means of circumventing rules and regulations not desired by commercial banks. See J. ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS,
MARKETS AND GROWTH 266-281 (1983). Zysman's description of the complexities of a capital

market-oriented and price-competitive financial system provides a useful background for
understanding the U.S. banking regulatory structure.
43. For a discussion of the "weakly coordinated and disparate elements" comprising the
federal bank regulatory structure, see M. Cohen, supra note 14, at 212.
VOL. 19, NO. 4
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federal charters and state charters. National banks with federal charters
are regulated by the Comptroller, are automatically member banks of the
Federal Reserve System and are covered by insurance through the FDIC.
State-chartered banks may be insured member banks of the Federal Reserve System, in which case they are regulated by the FRB, or nonmember
insured banks, subjecting them to regulation by the FDIC. Only a handful of
state-chartered nonmember noninsured banks are in existence, and they are
not significant international lenders. 44
The existence of state-chartered and federally-chartered banks with separate primary federal regulatory agencies has meant the development of
distinctive and sometimes contradictory supervisory patterns which have
extended to regulations affecting international lending. 45 Widespread questioning of commercial bank soundness in the wake of the LDC debt crisis has
led to a recognition that supervisory coordination is insufficient and that
regulation and supervision of international lending is often ineffective. The
comments of an FDIC official in Congressional testimony reflect this concern: "As bank supervisors, we failed to effectively caution American banks
to restrain foreign lending growth. Although portfolio concentrations were
identified and commented upon, sufficiently firm steps were not taken to
limit concentrations and the leveraging of bank capital. Without question,
' 46
our supervisory efforts need buttressing.
2. The FRB and the Treasury Department

The Treasury Department and the FRB have some shared responsibilities
in the area of general monetary and fiscal policy. Because of the Comptroller's relation to the Treasury Department, there is frequent opportunity for
rivalry and disagreement between the FRB and the Comptroller over regulatory policies relating to commercial banks. The Treasury Department
and the FRB have also taken somewhat different approaches to the general
handling of the LDC debt crisis. In separate statements early in May of 1984,
Martin Feldstein, the former chairman of President Reagan's Council of
Economic Advisers, and Paul Volcker, Chairman of the FRB, emphasized
44. K. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 1, at 3 (1977).
45. Historically, the Comptroller has developed the most comprehensive system of regulation of international lending. For example, the Comptroller began examining the overseas units
of national banks in 1965. In 1973, the Comptroller began requiring all national banks to file
reports of condition on a global consolidated basis. International Debt, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 351 (1983) [hereinafter cited as REP. 98-81]
(statement of C. Todd Conover, former Comptroller of the Currency).
46. REP. 98-16, statement of William Isaac, at 217. See also REP. 98-81 at 382: "Bank
regulators were insufficiently sensitive to the developing problems in foreign lending and failed
to take firm steps to limit credit concentrations and the leveraging of bank capital."
FALL 1985

1070

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

that rising U.S. interest rates posed a grave threat to rescheduling efforts
and rendered the crisis management approach of the past quite ineffective.
Former Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, on the other hand, served
as the spokesman for the Reagan Administration policy of IMF conditionality, developing country "adjustment" and austerity, modest resources for
the World Bank, and opposition to more government regulation of commercial banks.47

3. Commercial Banks and the Supervisory Process
Commercial banks have had yet another perspective on IMF funding and
the general supervision of banks by the three federal bank regulatory
agencies. In congressional hearings on proposed IMF funding increases, for
example, commercial bank representatives emphasized the need for a
strengthened IMF, minimal changes in federal bank regulatory agency and
SEC reporting requirements, and a continued reliance on internal bank
management controls.4 8
Increased funding for the IMF was achieved, but at a price to the commercial banks. As Senator Jake Garn noted, "the price of an $8.4 billion
increase in the IMF authorization in Congress is going to be legislation [the
International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (the ILSA)] so that lawmakers can go home and report that 'we did not bail out the banks."' 49 Not
surprisingly, major commercial banks took a dim view of this seemingly
punitive approach. One bank official observed in Congressional testimony
on the IMF legislation that,
While we believe the importance of the IMF to the U.S. recovery is being
recognized in the Congress, we are concerned that juxtaposed with this positive
development is the feeling that U.S. banks must be penalized for their international credit exposure and that the banking system should somehow be protected
from itself by imposing legislative controls that would produce a more defensive
and conservative ap roach by the banks toward levels and concentrations of
international credit.

As enacted, the ILSA provided for selective additional controls on international lending by commercial banks in the United States. While falling
47. The PressuresMountfor a New Initiative, Fin. Times, May 10, 1984, at 18; see also Lewis,
Regan, in Paris, Spurns Allied Bidfor New Approach to Debt Crisis, N.Y. Times, May 18,1984,
at A5.
48. See, for example, REP. 98-16, supra note 34, at 95 (statement of Peter C. Read, Vice
President of the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade); To Increase the U.S. Quota in the
InternationalMonetary Fund and Related Matters, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Financeand
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 564 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as REP. 98-17]
(statement of Robert Heller, Vice President for International Economics, Bank of America).
49. Rejection of Supervision Plan Clouds Convention, Fin. Times, Apr. 18, 1983. The ILSA,
Pub. L. No. 98-181, tit. IX, 97 Stat. 1278 (1983), is set forth at 12 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.
50. REP. 98-16 supra note 34, at 100.
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short of providing any comprehensive regulatory approach, the ILSA did
establish new capital adequacy and reserve requirements and required the
application of new accounting and reporting standards for international
lending by commercial banks.
4. Accounting and Disclosure Requirements
To an extent not present in the other countries discussed in this analysis,
commercial banks in the United States are subject to extensive accounting
and disclosure requirements. Despite such requirements, there is a growing
concern that allowing accountants to satisfy their professional responsibilities with a declaration that the financial statements of a bank or other
company are presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles may permit banks to reveal themselves in the best, rather than in
the most truthful light. The recent problems of Continental Illinois and
Bank of America are general cases in point. 5'
Three specific items have recently been cited for special attention by
federal bank regulatory agencies: (a) accounting for overdue loans and
capitalization of interest, (b) accounting for fees on international loans, and
(c) the contents of bank call reports.
a. Accounting for Overdue Loans and Capitalization of Interest
In June of 1984, a joint statement by the Comptroller and the FRB sought
to clarify the regulators' position on accounting for loans on which interest is
more than ninety days overdue. Traditionally, banks put such loans on
"nonaccrual" status, which meant that banks could count interest on such
loans towards earnings only when it was actually received and had to
subtract from current income any interest that had been recorded but not
actually collected.52
In the early 1980s, however, in connection with loans to Argentina and
other Latin American countries and as a result of a certain "bending" of the
53
existing rules, such loans had often not been put on nonaccrual status.
51. America's FinancialFollies, ECONOMIST, August 25, 1984, at 16; G. C. Hill & M. Tharp,
Big Quarterly Deficit Stuns BankAmerica, Wall St. J., July 18, 1985, at 1; W. Hall & P. Taylor,
BankAmerica's Bombshell Rocks Wall Street, Fin. Times, July 18, 1985, at 13.
52. Comptroller and FRB, Joint Policy Statement on Nonaccrual Status of Loans, FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 86,017 (June 11, 1984), [hereinafter cited as Statement on NonaccrualStatus].
53. Sheshunoff & Co., an Austin, Texas bank consulting firm, estimated that as of the end of
fiscal 1983, the percentage of nonperforming loans still shown as accruing interest was as follows
for certain major banks: Crocker, 30.69 percent; Bank of America, 29.07 percent; Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 28.04 percent; Security Pacific, 21.09 percent; Continental
Illinois, 20.47 percent. Other major banks, however, did not typically accrue interest on
nonperforming loans: J.P. Morgan, 1.3 percent; Citicorp, 3.23 percent; Chemical Bank, 3.53
percent; Chase Manhattan, 4.94 percent; First Chicago, 5.35 percent. New Bank Rules Could
Affect Domestic Loans, Wall St. J., June 20, 1984, at 4.
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Under the more flexible interpretation that had been applied by many
commercial banks, the determination of whether a loan should be considered nonaccruing was based on whether it was 90 days late at the end of the
quarter. Under the stricter traditional interpretation, a loan was to be
placed on a nonaccrual basis as soon as it was 90 days past due, regardless of
the point during a fiscal quarter at which that happened.5 4
The joint policy statement was straightforward in its requirements:
Banks may not accrue interest on any loan when principal or interest is due and
has remained unpaid for ninety days or more unless the loan is both well secured
and in the process of collection;
Loans which reach nonaccrual status may not be restored to accruing status until
all delinquent principal and/or interest has been brought current, or the loan
becomes both well secured and in the process of collection;
The date on which a loan reaches nonaccrual status is determined by the
contractual terms of the loan. If a loan reaches nonaccrual status on a date which
falls between official reporting dates, it remains55on nonaccrual status until it meets
the criteria for restoration to accruing status.
Similarly, there has been disagreement over the accounting treatment of
capitalized interest. Traditionally, loans on which interest rates have been
reduced below market rates must be shown separately on balance sheets. A
more liberal accounting treatment of capitalized interest would permit
56
continued reporting of market rates under certain circumstances.
b. Accounting for Fees on International Loans
The ILSA imposed new requirements relating to accounting for fees on
international loans. It provides in pertinent part that, "in order to avoid
excessive debt service burdens on debtor countries, no banking institution
shall charge, in connection with the restructuring of an international loan,
any fee exceeding the administrative cost of the restructuring unless it
amortizes such fee over the effective life of each such loan." 57 Subsequently,
54. The problem became acute at the end of the first quarter of 1984. See Bennett, Strict U.S.
Ruling to Slash Profits of Banks That Lent to Argentina, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1984, at Al:
"Thus, at the end of the first quarter, Argentina merely paid enough interest so that its loan
payments were less than ninety days in arrears. That meant that, by the end of March, interest
had been paid only up to the first few days of January. Nonetheless, the banks counted toward
their earnings interest that had been accrued through the end of March." See, Banks May Take
Hit on Foreign Loans After InterestAccrual Rules, [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 42,
at 1065 (June 25, 1984).
55. Statement on Nonaccrual Status, supra note 52.
56. How Can American Banks Account for Those Latin Loans?, ECONOMIST 87 (June 2,
1984); See also, Task Force Reported Studying Changes in Capitalizationof Interest, 43 [JulyDec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 41 (July 9, 1984). Capitalization of interest is not
explicitly covered by existing bank regulations, but it would affect the judgment of bank
regulatory agencies on the "collectibility" of a loan and thus on a loan's classification. An
interagency task force has been formed to review accounting procedures relating to the
capitalization of interest.
57. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3905(a)(1) (Supp. 1985).
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each of the three federal bank regulatory58agencies issued new regulations on
accounting for international loan fees.
The final regulations issued by the Comptroller, the FRB and the FDIC
established uniform requirements for accounting for fees associated with the
restructuring of international lending arrangements and nonrefundable fees
charged by banking institutions in connection with other international
loans. 59 They distinguished between restructured international loans and
other international loans in the required accounting treatment for fees.
A "restructured loan" must meet two criteria. First, the borrower whose
loan is being restructured because of debt service difficulties must be a
resident of a foreign country experiencing a generalized inability of public
and private sector obligors to meet their external debt obligations on a
timely basis because of a lack of, or restraints on, the availability of foreign
exchange in that country. Second, the terms of the loan must have been
revised to extend the original schedule of payments or reduce the stated
interest, or new funds must have been provided for the benefit of the
borrower which have the same effect as extending the schedule of payments
or reducing stated interest on the original loan. For any loan that meets
these criteria, the regulations prohibit a banking institution from charging
any fee unless the portion of the fee in excess of administrative costs is
deferred and amortized over the effective life of the loan. 6° Fees on other
international loans need not be amortized but must be accounted for 6to1
accrue an appropriate portion of the fee as income over the life of the loan.
c. Bank Call Reports and SEC
Reporting Requirements
Most commercial banks engaged in foreign lending are subject to regular
bank examinations by the appropriate federal bank regulatory agency. On a
periodic basis, they are also required to prepare call reports which contain
extensive information on such matters as capital adequacy, asset quality,
management quality, earnings and profitability, and liquidity. 62 Ratings
based on performance in these categories are used to arrive at composite
ratings, which are used by federal regulators
as a basis for subjecting
"problem" banks to greater surveillance. 63
For national banks, certain basic changes in reporting policies have been

58. The regulations were adopted as amendments to 12 C.F.R. Pts. 20, 211 and 351.
59. 49 Fed. Reg. 12,192 (1984) 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.9, 211.45, 351.2 (1984); see also, FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 99,917 (1983-84 Transfer Binder).
60. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.9(a), 211.45(a) and 351.2(c) (1985).
61. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.9(b), 211.45(b) and § 351.2(d)(1985).
62. R. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION AROUND THE WORLD 66 (Group of Thirty, 1982) [hereinafter cited as DALE, BANK SUPERVISION].

63. Id.
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adopted. The Comptroller has issued a rule providing for the application of

disclosure requirements for banks under its jurisdiction that are quite similar to disclosure requirements imposed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC) on reporting companies. In July of 1984, the Comptroller sought public comments on ways to revise disclosure policies to help
market participants, including uninsured depositors, obtain better information about the condition of national banks. 64

Of course, to a certain extent, SEC reporting requirements have long
been applicable to commercial banks. Banks and bank holding companies
which meet certain criteria, including either the filing of a registration
statement for the public offering of securities or having more than specified
minimum assets and shareholders, are subject to SEC reporting requirements. Moreover, the federal bank regulatory agencies are charged with
developing and administering other disclosure requirements, which in many
instances are required to be substantially similar to SEC requirements.65
Prior to some significant changes in SEC reporting requirements achieved
in 1983, there was dissatisfaction with disclosure rules that seemed to permit
significant differences in the ways banks presented information about troubled overseas loans. 66 Pre-1983 SEC rules were generally ineffective in

providing shareholders with enough information to make realistic assessments of the riskiness of foreign lending. Securities Act Release No. 33-6478
(the SEC Disclosure Release) amended certain guidelines concerning disclosure by bank holding companies with respect to general information

64. In an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Disclosure of Financial and Other
Information Regarding National Banks, 49 Fed. Reg. 28,566 (1984), the Comptroller requested comments on a wide range of issues concerning the disclosure system:
* What are the general characteristics of an effective disclosure system?
* Are quarterly bank call reports an appropriate mechanism to disclose information to the
marketplace?
* Should certain items be exempt from disclosure requirements?
* Should all financial statements that national banks prepare be audited by independent
public accountants?
* Should the Comptroller adopt rules of practice similar to those adopted by the SEC
enabling that agency to discipline accountants who prepare financial statements?
Comptroller Seeks Comment on Changes in National Bank Disclosure Policy, [July-Dec.]
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 104 (July 16,1984); see also, FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
86,011. Proposed rules were issued in Sept. 1984 (49 Fed. Reg. 37,246 (1984)) and the
Comptroller issued a final rule on Oct. 24, 1985 (50 Fed. Reg. 45,276 (1985)).
65. See Section 12(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; see also, Coombe & Lapic,
Problem Loans, Foreign Outstandings, and Other Developments in Bank Disclosure, 40 Bus.
LAW. 485, 513 (1985) (considerable progress has already been made in harmonizing bank
regulatory agency and SEC disclosure requirements).
66. Taylor, U.S. Banks Differ Sharply on Foreign Debt Reporting, Fin. Times, Mar. 17,
1983.
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about nonaccrual, past due and restructured loans, potential problem loans,
foreign outstandings and loan concentrations.6 7 The guidelines, which are
set forth at Guide 3 to Regulation S-K, require that nonaccrual, past due and
restructured loans be separately identified.
A first category requires that policies with respect to placing loans on
nonaccrual status be discussed. A second category of required disclosure
consists of loans that are still on an accrual basis but are ninety days past due
as to either principal or interest payments. A third category consists of
accrual basis loans that are not ninety days past due but are troubled debt
restructurings.68
The SEC Disclosure Release also clarified the applicability of Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 15 (FASB 15) and Staff Accounting
Bulletin Nos. 49 and 49A (together, SAB 49).69 FASB 15 provides in
pertinent part that a restructuring of debt constitutes a "troubled debt
restructuring" if the creditor for economic or legal reasons related to the
debtor's financial difficulties grants a concession to the debtor that it would
not otherwise consider. SAB 49 requires certain disclosures about negotiations with debtor countries by bank holding companies filing reports required by the Securities Act or the Securities Exchange Act. 70 Subsequently, the SEC issued some more specific guidelines with respect to the
reporting of restructured Argentine debt.7'
B.

REGULATIONS AND RATIOS

1. Loans to Single Borrowers
12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) provides that the total loans and extensions of credit
by a national banking association to a "person" outstanding at one time and
67. Securities Act Release No. 6478, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1983), set forth at 17 C.F.R. §§
210,229, 231 and 241. These amendments revised existing guidelines dealing with nonperforming loans to focus more broadly on the various risk elements involved in lending activities. They
are applicable to filings containing financial statements for fiscal years ending on or after Dec.
31, 1983.
68. For a comprehensive discussion of revised Guide 3, see Coombe & Lapic, supra note 65,
at 502-512.
69. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 15, Accounting by Debtors and Creditors for Troubled Debt Restructurings, June 1977;
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 49, Disclosures by Bank Holding Companies about Certain
Foreign Loans, Oct. 26, 1982, as amended by Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 49A, Jan. 18, 1983.
70. SAB 49 provides that the disclosure should include a discussion of the nature of such
negotiations and a general description of (a) any agreements to extend payments or reduce
interest, (b) any commitments to extend additional borrowings to the foreign country and (c)
any other arrangements, such as agreements to maintain deposits with government banks.
71. The guidelines were set forth in a letter dated Dec. 28, 1984, from John J. Huber,
Director of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance, to Robert Dineen, Esq., of Shearman &
Sterling, New York City.
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not fully secured by collateral shall not exceed 15 percent of the unimpaired

capital and surplus of the association. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(d)(1) provides that
loans or extensions of credit to foreign governments, their agencies and

instrumentalities will be combined with one another under section 84 only if
they fail to meet either of two tests at the time the loan or extension of credit
is made: (1) the borrower has resources or revenues of its own sufficient over
time to service its debt obligations (the "means" test) and (2) the purpose of
the loan or extension of credit is consistent with the purpose of the borrower's general business (the "purpose" test). 72 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 324, similar limits are imposed on state member banks.
2. CapitalAdequacy
Explicit focus on capital ratios has been a relatively recent development in
U.S. bank regulation. In late 1981, the FRB and the Comptroller identified
two distinct types of capital to which they would direct regulatory attention.

Primary capital consists of common stock, perpetual preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits, contingency and other capital reserves, mandatory

convertible securities and the allowance for possible loan losses. Total
capital consists of primary capital plus limited-life preferred stock and bank
subordinated debt.73

One result of the ILSA has been the attempt to impose minimum capital

adequacy ratios on commercial banks. 74 In July 1984, in separate state-

ments, the FRB, the FDIC and the Comptroller announced their intentions
of raising primary capital requirements (guidelines in the case of the FRB)
to 5.5 percent of total assets for large commercial banks.75 Formerly, FRB
and Comptroller guidelines were 5 percent for large commercial banks and 6

72. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(d)(2) provides that in order to show that the "means" test and the
"purpose" test have been satisfied, a bank must retain certain information in its files. The
required information is to include a statement describing the legal status and degree of financial
and operational autonomy of the borrowing entity. For a general discussion of lending limits for
national banks, see K. J. Rojc, National Bank Lending Limits-A New Framework, 40 Bus.
LAW. 903 (1985).
73. S. TALLEY, BANK CAPITAL TRENDS AND FINANCING, FRB STAFF STUDY No. 122, at I
(February 1983).
74. The provisions with respect to capital adequacy are set forth at 12 U.S.C. § 3907.
75. The FDIC proposed rule on capital adequacy standards for banks is set forth at 49 Fed.
Reg. 29,399 (1984); the Comptroller's proposed regulation on capital requirements is set forth
at 49 Fed. Reg. 34,838 (1984); a statement of the proposed FRB guidelines is set forth at 49 Fed.
Reg. 30,317 (1984). According to figures compiled by Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., primary
capital ratios as of March 31, 1984 for certain major commercial banks were as follows: Bank
America, 5.04 percent; Bankers Trust, 5.51 percent; Chase Manhattan, 5.55 percent; Chemical
New York, 5.15 percent; Citicorp, 5.09 percent; Continental Illinois, 5.54 percent; First
Chicago, 5.96 percent; Manufacturers Hanover, 5.46 percent; and J. P. Morgan, 6.95 percent;
Research Note-Financial Group, Primary Capital: Banking Regulations, June 24, 1984. See
also the slightly different figures set forth at Taylor, Fed Callsfor CapitalRatio Boost for Banks,
Fin. Times, July 24, 1984, at 3.
VOL. 19, NO. 4

SYMPOSIUM/INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING: Part I

1077

percent for community banks with assets of less than $1 billion. 76 On
February 11, 1985, the FDIC approved a final rule raising primary capital
requirements to 5.5 percent of total assets. 77 The Comptroller approved a
similar rule on March 11, 1985 and the FRB
has approved guidelines setting
78
identical minimum capital requirements.
Actually, the three federal bank regulatory agencies have long had the
goal of establishing uniform capital adequacy ratios for all commercial
banks, but they have differed over the levels at which the standard should be
set. 79 The differences were apparent in the July 1984 formulations of proposed rules. Most importantly, the FRB proposed that the new capital
adequacy ratios be stated as guidelines rather than rules. As adopted, the
FRB guidelines retained the "zone concept" and included financial factors
other than capital ratios in considering the "zone" classification of a banking

institution.

80

76. FDICProposes Mandatory CapitalRules; Fed and OCC Expected to Follow, [July-Dec.]
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 97 (July 16, 1984). In December of 1981, the FRB and the
Comptroller adopted capital adequacy guidelines for national and state member banks and
bank holding companies. In Dec. 1983, the FRB reaffirmed these capital adequacy ratios (49
Fed. Reg. 794 (1983)) and incorporated them as Appendix A to Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. Part
225. Even before the introduction of new guidelines, capital asset ratios of major commercial
banks in the U.S. compared favorably with those of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
United Kingdom, although they were below those of Switzerland: Federal Republic of Germany, 3.31; Switzerland, largest five banks, 5.52, all banks, 5.19; United Kingdom, largest four
banks, 4.80, all banks, 4.14; United States, largest 10 banks, 4.93, largest 25 banks, 5.09; see R.
WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS, DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS (IMF, 1983)
Table 6: Capital-Asset Ratios of Banks in Major Capital Market Countries, 1977-1982 (calculated by IMF Staff), at 8. Because of differing definitions and statistical measurements,
comparisons of the capital positions of banks in different countries are extremely difficult.
Some countries allow banks to establish hidden reserves by writing down particular assets or
carrying others below market value. While hidden reserves are not permitted in the U.S.,
certain common accounting practices have a similar effect. Hertzberg, Some Agile U.S. Banks
Can Balance Books and Show Profit Rise by FinancialJuggling, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1984, at 9
(European edition). Hertzberg notes that U.S. commercial banks sometimes create one-time
profits by selling assets that they have acquired when refinancing the debts of troubled
corporate borrowers. Banks may accept securities in return for writing off debt. Then, if the
financial position of the borrower improves, the market value of such securities may rise
rapidly. U.S. banks may have hidden losses because no writing down of assets to market or
implicit market value is required. Unrealized appreciation (really hidden reserves) might occur
in connection with real estate used for bank operations. H. WALLICH, statement in The
InternationalDebt Problem and Its Impact on Finance and Trade, 318 PLI COMMERCIAL LAW
AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK, 64 (B. Campbell & R. Herzstein, eds. 1984).
77. J. Rosenstein, FDIC Raises CapitalRatio Requirements, AM. BANKER, Feb. 12, 1985,
at 1.
78. FDIC and OCC Adopt New, Uniform CapitalRequirements, [Jan.-June] WASH. FIN.
REP. (BNA) No. 44, at 449 (Mar. 18, 1985).
79. Fed Proposes New Capital Guidelines in Break from FDIC and OCC Actions, [JulyDec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 168 (July 30, 1984).

80. Id.; for an analysis questioning the validity and utility of capital ratios generally in
analyzing bank safety and soundness, see J. Mingo, Capital Ratios: The Reg Q Fiasco of the
Future, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Jan. 21, 1985, at 1.

FALL 1985

1078

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Regulatory concern has also been directed to the inclusion of so-called
"off balance sheet items" in measures of capital adequacy. The Comptroller
has been considering the imposition of higher capital requirements on
institutions which have low levels of liquid assets such as Treasury bills or
significant off balance sheet activities such as standby letters of credit which
are not reflected in existing minimum bank primary capital ratios. In July
1985, FRB Chairman Paul Volcker suggested the adoption of risk-based
capital rules which would force banks to supplement their capital reserves
for riskier activities,
such as a large number of off balance sheet items or
81
problem loans.
3. Liquidity
The three federal regulators have not attempted to impose standard
requirements for liquidity ratios. However, evaluation of a commercial
bank's liquidity position is a normal part of the bank examination process. In
general terms, the regulatory agencies consider a commercial bank's liquidity position with respect to such matters as (a) volatility of deposits, (b)
availability of readily marketable assets or assets convertible into cash, (c)
the technical competence of bank personnel, (d) reliance on interestsensitive funds, and (e) access to money markets.82
4. Foreign Exchange Exposure
12 C.F.R. § 20.5(a) states that each national bank and Federal branch or
agency of a foreign bank, which for its own account has assets, liabilities or
positions in any of certain foreign currencies in excess of a specified dollar
amount, must file the so-called "Monthly Consolidated Foreign Currency
Report." 83 Pursuant to the International Investment Survey Act of 1976,84
and to provide information requested by the IMF in accordance with section
8(a) of the Bretton Woods Act, 85 every person (including banking institutions) engaging (a) in specified transactions in foreign exchange or (b) in
specified transfers of credit between any person within the United States and

81. Paul Taylor, 'High-Risk' U.S. Banks May FaceNew Curbs, Fin. Times, Apr. 16, 1985, at
1; M. Langley and L. McGinley, HigherCapitalto Cover Risk Urgedfor Banks, Wall St. J., July
19, 1985, at 5. Examples of off balance sheet "contingent liabilities" that have been suggested
for inclusion in a risk capital measurement include: (a) note issuance facilities and revolving
underwriting facilities ("NIFs" and "RUFs"); (b) interest rate swaps; (c) standby letters of
credit, and (d) sales with recourse. For a discussion, see C. Reichardt, Getting Caught Off
Balance By Hidden Risks, AM. BANKER, June 20, 1985, at 4.
82. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 64; see, for example, The Comptroller's
Manual for National Bank Examiners at sections 203, 301, 405, 503, and 600.
83. Form FFIEC 035.
84. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3103 et seq. (1979 & Supp. 1985).
85. 22 U.S.C. § 286f (1976).
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any person outside of the United States, is required to furnish certain
information on prescribed report forms. 86

C. SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING

1. Country Risk and Provisionsfor Loan Losses

Country risk 87 supervision and provisions for loan losses 88 are among the
most controversial aspects of federal regulatory policy with respect to inter-

national lending. Prior to 1977, there were significant differences among the
regulatory agencies in their approaches to supervising country risk exposure. In 1977, the Comptroller, the FRB and the FDIC began collecting a
"Uniform Country Exposure Lending Survey" on a semi-annual basis. 89 In
1978, joint examination procedures were adopted with a view towards
encouraging diversification of loan portfolios, identifying problem credits
subject to transfer risk and large country concentrations of loans, and
evaluating the extent to which banks had satisfactory systems for monitoring
country exposure and assessing country risk. 90
The joint examination procedures adopted in 1978 included the creation
of the Interagency Country Exposure Review Committee (ICERC), composed of representatives of the Comptroller, the FRB and the FDIC.
ICERC meets three times a year and considers about twenty countries at
each meeting, evaluating their current economic situation and future eco-

nomic prospects. 9' The ICERC country risk examination system consists of:
(a) identifying countries with actual, imminent and potential debt servicing
problems, (b) citing loans to countries with actual or imminent debt prob-

86. 31 C.F.R. § 128.2 (1985).
87. The FRB has stated that country risk is comprised of legal, economic, political and social
factors that accompany lending to foreign economic entities whose payment ability may be
affected by the actions of foreign states. It includes risk associated with "political or social
upheaval, nationalization or appropriation, government repudiation of external debts, exchange controls, or foreign exchange shortfalls." A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign
Lending, FRBNY Q. REV. 1-2 (Spring 1978).
88. Regulation S-X requires bank financial statements to include the allowance for loan
losses and the provision for loan losses. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.9-03(7), 210.9-04(11) (1985). See
Coombe and Lapic, supra note 65, at 502-503.
89. Since 1979, aggregate data from country exposure reports have been published regularly
by the three supervisory agencies. As Pecchioli notes, "such aggregate surveys provide a
comprehensive picture of the U.S. banking system's overall exposure to individual foreign
countries by location of claims and country of ultimate risk." R. PECCHIOLI, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BANKING 90, n. 21 (OECD, 1983).

90. See generally, A New Supervisory Approach to Foreign Lending, supra note 87, at 1-6;
REP. 98-16, supra note 62, at 332 (statement of J. Charles Partee).
91. For a more complete description of the work of ICERC, see Robert Bench, A
Framework and New Techniques for International Bank Supervision, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1982 (mimeo); and General Accounting Office, Bank Examination for
Country Risk and International Lending, Sept. 2, 1982.
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lems for the attention of bank management in examination reports, (c)
including "special comments" in bank examination reports when loans to
countries with potential debt problems exceed certain levels in relation to
bank capital, and (d) evaluating the internal systems used by banks to
manage country exposures.92
The issues of country risk and reserves against possible loan losses have

been the subject of a "Joint Memorandum" of the Comptroller, the FRB
and the FDIC. 93 It outlined a five-point program, including measures to
strengthen the existing program of country risk examination, evaluation and
disclosure. It also recommended the establishment of a system of special
reserves against possible loan losses in countries of apparently high risk.94
Some of the measures suggested in the Joint Memorandum were adopted as
regulations implementing the ILSA. 95
The Joint Memorandum stated that "banks should make public disclosure
of all concentrations of country exposure that are material." '96 Reflecting
this determination, a Country Exposure Report (CER), developed pursuant to FFIEC guidelines, must be filed by commercial banks if they have a
foreign branch or subsidiary, an Edge or Agreement Corporation, or a
Puerto Rico or U.S. possession branch and consolidated claims against
foreign residents that exceed twenty million dollars. 97 Assets to be reported
on the CER include loans and securities, as well as a number of other
items. 98 CERs must be filed within forty-five days of the end of each
99
quarter.

While all data on the CER is confidential, a public Country Exposure

Information Report must also be filed. It must contain information on
92. Procedures of ICERC have not generally been made public and are, of course, designed
to supplement rather than supplant the independent country risk analysis conducted by
commercial banks. However, ICERC is more heavily involved in country risk analysis per se
than are its regulatory counterparts in the other creditor countries discussed herein. According
to DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 65, ICERC at its three meetings each year "votes
either to classify loans to a particular country or to designate countries as strong, moderately
strong or weak. The country designation determines the prudent exposure limit relative to
capital and therefore provides a basis for limiting loans." See also REP. 98-16, supra note 34, at
17-18 (statement of Charles A. Bowsher).
93. Joint Memorandum of the Comptroller, FRB and FDIC: Program for Improved Supervision and Regulation of International Lending, submitted to the Chairman of the House
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Apr. 7, 1983, reprinted in REP. 98-17,
supra note 48, at 128 [hereinafter cited as the Joint Memorandum].
94. The very modest provisions for loan losses in the U.S. were certainly a factor influencing
the Joint Memorandum's call for more generous reserves.
95. The ILSA provided that the federal bank regulatory agencies should issue rules requiring
banks under their jurisdiction to set aside special reserves for certain loans, to amortize loan
rescheduling fees over the life of a loan and to maintain adequate capital levels.
96. Joint Memorandum, supra note 93, at 5.
97. FFIEC Form 009.
98. FFIEC Form 009, Instructions at pts. III(A) and (F).
99. FFIEC Form 009, Instructions at pt. II(C).
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"exposures" that exceed the lesser of .75 percent of total assets or 15 percent
of primary capital to any one country. 100 In early February of 1984, the

Comptroller, the FRB and the FDIC issued final regulations on the reporting and disclosure of international assets.101 Pursuant to the final regula-

tions, each "banking institution" is required to submit to its primary federal
banking supervisor, at least quarterly, information on the amount and
composition of its international
assets that are "material" in relation to its
02
total assets and to capital.1

Other regulations, which implement section 905(a) of the ILSA, require
banking institutions to establish special reserves, so-called allocated transfer
risk reserves or "ATRRs", against the risk presented in certain international assets when the appropriate federal banking agency determines that
specified conditions, including impairment of a bank's assets by a "pro-

tracted inability" of public or private debtors in a foreign country to make
payments on their external debt, exist.10 3 Alternatively, the regulations
provide that a bank need not establish an ATRR if it writes down the value
of the specified international assets. 10 4 There are also certain circumstances

involving new lending under which ATRRs can be avoided. There is no
requirement that an ATRR be established when an IMF or similar economic
adjustment program is being followed and it can be demonstrated that new
10 5
lending would enhance the debt-servicing capacity of a given country.

2. Lender of Last Resort

Expectations concerning the lender of last resort function are central to an
efficient international financial system. In the United States, this function
has been explicitly assumed by the Federal
Reserve System and the FDIC,
10 6
depending on the nature of the crisis.

100. FFIEC Press Release, Dec. 21, 1983.
101. Comptroller, FRB and FDIC, Regulations on Reporting and Disclosure of International Assets, 12 C.F.R. pts. 20, 211 and 351.
102. The regulations were prompted by the ILSA, which required the federal banking
agencies to promulgate regulations requiring banking institutions with foreign country exposure to submit information regarding such exposure at least four times a year. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 3906 (Supp. 1985).
103. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(b)(2), 211.43(b)(2) and 351.1(b)(2)(ii) (1985). Pursuant to SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 56, the establishment of an ATRR would also need to be described as
part of Loan Loss Experience, Item IV of Guide 3. 49 Fed. Reg. 4,936 (1984).
104. 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.8(c)(4), 211.43(c)(4) and 351.1(b)(3)(iv) (1985). To date, the ATRR
provisions have been applied only to Zaire, the Sudan, Poland, Nicaragua and Bolivia. M.
Langley, Regulator Lists CountriesWhose Loans Require Special Reserves at U.S. Banks, Wall
St. J., July 24, 1985.
105. R. DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 133 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING,

106. For a useful summary of the ways in which lender of last resort functions are exercised
by the Federal Reserve System and by the FDIC, see DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 62,
at 67-68.
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Any bank which maintains reserves with the appropriate Federal Reserve
Bank is entitled to make use of the Federal Reserve System's statutory
lending powers to discount eligible paper or to make advances secured by
satisfactory collateral. Pursuant to section 7 of the IBA, such advances could
be made to any branch or agency of a foreign bank that maintains reserves
under the Federal Reserve System. 10 7 In addition, the Federal Reserve
System could be expected to provide indirect liquidity assistance to foreign
establishments of United States banks by channeling credit through the
United States parent bank's office.
True insolvency would result in performance of the lender of last resort
function by the FDIC.10 8 The FDIC has a number of options in such cases.
First, it could provide insurance payments to the depositors of a failed
institution. Second, it could invite bids from solvent banks to assume deposit
liabilities and certain assets of a failed bank. Third, it could provide direct
financial assistance to a bank which is in danger of closing. In addition, a
solvency crisis might require the injection of permanent new capital by other
09
banks, the Federal Reserve System or even the federal government.
3. Treatment of Branches and Subsidiaries
of U.S. Banks Operating Abroad
Sections 25 and 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act and section 4(c)(13) of
the Bank Holding Company Act give U.S. banking organizations the legal
authority to operate abroad. The specific terms and conditions are determined by the FRB and are decribed in Regulation K. "10 Generally accepted
accounting principles, SEC requirements and FRB requirements all insure
that consolidated accounting procedures will be followed with respect to
branches and majority-owned subsidiaries. Capital ratios apply on a consolidated basis, but consideration would be given to the fact that under certain
circumstances foreign branches and subsidiaries of U.S. banks would be
permitted to engage in riskier activities than the parent bank.'' Regulation
K supports these supervisory efforts by requiring that a U.S. banking
organization must obtain approval from the FRB before acquiring or estab-

107. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 153.
108. One observer suggests that true insolvency might arise when the amount of bad debts
which must be written off exceeds the equity capital of the bank in question. Brittan, Problems
of Last Resort Lenders, Fin. Times, May 24, 1984, at 25.
109. Id.
110. Sections 25 and 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act concern the operations of Edge and
Agreement corporations. Section 4(c)(13) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13)) governs certain overseas activities of bank holding companies. The FRB
has implemented these statutory provisions in Regulation K.
111. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 131.
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lishing a foreign subsidiary and must maintain sufficient information on the
activities of each foreign subsidiary to permit an examination of its affairs
from the U.S. office of the parent. 112 Thus, the bank examination process
covers branches and (to a lesser extent partially dependent on local laws)
subsidiaries of U.S. banks." 3 However, despite some recent changes, it is
still the case that foreign branches and subsidiaries of the United States
banks are currently treated differently from United States headquarters.
4. Treatment of Foreign Banks
in the U.S.
The International Banking Act of 1978 (the IBA) created a federal
supervisory authority and regulatory structure for United States branches
and agencies of foreign banks, which had previously been regulated almost
entirely by the states. 114 With certain exceptions appropriate to the nature
and extent of their activities, the general rule is that U.S. branches and
subsidiaries of foreign banks are subject to the reporting requirements that
apply to U.S. banks. 15 Pursuant to the terms of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 (the BHCA), the FRB also imposes extensive reporting requirements relating to the financial structure and condition of the parent bank. 116
At present, while there are some significant differences between standards
applied to foreign banks and domestic banks, the federal bank regulatory
agencies have taken steps to conform requirements applicable to foreign
banks operating in the United States to those applicable to domestic
7
banks.ti
In December of 1984, the FDIC revised the existing asset pledge and asset
maintenance requirements for insured branches, set limits on concentrations of transfer risk and began to require a minimum capital adequacy
ledger account evidencing funding of the branch by the parent in lieu of

112. Hou'r

AND MARTINSON,

supra note 1, at 15.

113. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 133.

114. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101 et seq. (Supp. 1985).
115. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 133-134. In addition, a number of
special reporting requirements are applicable. For example, FFIEC Form 002, Report of
Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks, must be filed quarterly
with the appropriate district Federal Reserve Bank. See G. Lindstrom and G. Pfund, United
States, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, 38 (Ernst & Whinney eds. 1985) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING.]

116. The FRB requires foreign banks that operate branches or agencies in the U.S. or
foreign bank holding companies that operate subsidiaries in the U.S. to file Form F.R. Y-7,

Annual Report of Foreign Banking Organizations.
117. Foreign banks seeking to establish branches, agencies or subsidiaries under state or
federal license are subject to the same chartering criteria and procedures as are domestic banks.
For a discussion of section 4 of the IBA, see S. J. Weiss, The Competitive Balance Between
Domestic and Foreign Banks in the United States, Comptroller of the Currency Staff Paper, at
43 (1980).
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existing asset maintenance rules. The amendments implemented the deposit
insurance provisions of the IBA and emphasized the FDIC's intent that
there be an equivalent for capital in insured branches.'" 8 On February 11,
1985, the FDIC adopted a final regulation increasing total capital requirebanks and insured branches of foreign banks from
ments for nonmember
9
five to six percent.11

The FFIEC has made changes in the reports required of United States
branches and agencies of foreign banks. Recently adopted changes alter the

form and substance of required reports of assets and liabilities and provide
greater conformity with information provided by United States banks in
quarterly call reports.' 20 Other proposed changes would require each
branch or agency that had more than thirty million dollars in total direct

claims on residents of foreign countries to provide certain "country risk"
information on the exposure of such branch or agency to its home country
and to the five other countries to which its exposure is greatest. 121
5. Attitudes Towards International
Cooperation
The ILSA directed the federal bank regulatory agencies to consult with

supervisory authorities of other countries to coordinate and improve inter118. Differences between foreign banks and domestic banks, particularly in the area of
capital adequacy requirements, have also been of concern to the FRB. See, for example, FRB,
Application of Fuji Bank Ltd. (Tokyo) to acquire Walter E. Heller & Co. (Chicago), approved
Dec. 20, 1983. In the Fuji Bank decision, the FRB expressed concern about the comparatively
low capital ratios of foreign banking organizations operating in the United States. It noted that
Fuji Bank's publicly reported primary capital ratio was "well below the Board's guidelines for
U.S. multinational bank holding companies." See also The Mitsubishi Bank, Limited, 70 FED.
RES. BULL. 518 (June 1984); Bank of Montreal, 70 FED. RES. BULL. 664 (Aug. 1984); and FRB
Order, December 18, 1984, approving the application of The Sanwa Bank Limited, Osaka,
Japan to acquire from Continental Illinois Corporation, Chicago, Illinois, the shares of Cobak
Corporation and Continental Illinois Leasing Corporation. The FRB noted that The Sanwa
Bank's primary capital ratio was well below the capital guidelines for U.S. multinational bank
holding companies. Foreign Bank Capital Continues to Disturb Central Bank, BANKING
EXPANSION RPrR., Jan. 21, 1985, at 7.

119. FDIC Release, Foreign Banks: Clarification and Definition of Deposit Insurance
Coverage, Dec. 21, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,614 (1984); J. Rosenstein, FDIC Raises Capital
Requirements, Am. Banker, Feb. 12, 1985, at 1. Required primary capital ratios were set at 5.5
percent.
120. FFIEC Release, July 24, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,119 (1984).
121. FFIEC Release, proposed Rule on Reporting Foreign Country Exposure by U.S.
Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks, 50 Fed. Reg. 2,722 (1985). The information that
United States branches and agencies of foreign banks are required to provide includes the
following: selected income data including provisions for loan losses; quarterly averages of
selected asset liability accounts; and reports on contingencies and commitments, such as
commitments to make and purchase loans, acceptances, and standby letters of credit. In
addition, such foreign branches and agencies will be required to submit information on their
past due, nonaccrual and renegotiated loans on the same type of form on which U.S. banks now
report this information.
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national lending supervision.' 22 The argument supporting the statutory
requirement is that international coordination of bank supervision is increasingly important in a period when banks of many countries make loans
to the same borrower and the quality of each bank's loans is affected by debt
subsequently incurred from other sources.
Attitudes of commercial banks and federal bank regulatory agencies
towards international supervision and cooperation have not always been
clearly expressed, although there now appears to be a common willingness
to explore greater international cooperation in the future. Recently, as the
May 1984 meetings sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
suggest, there has been a reconsideration of the appropriateness of international supervisory initiatives that would previously have been viewed as
unnecessary by commercial banks and redundant by bank supervisory
agencies.
III. Bank Regulation and Supervision
in the United Kingdom
A. GENERALLY

The approach to bank supervision in the United Kingdom contrasts with
the rule-based and frequently adversarial system that has developed in the
U.S. It is based on cooperation and frequent consultation between the Bank
of England and commercial banks, with a relatively limited supervisory role
assumed by H.M. Treasury. The supervisory system has developed on a
framework of prudential guidelines and extensive general reporting requirements rather than specific rules. One observer has described the
United
' 23
Kingdom banking system as the "least regulated in the world.'
George Blunden, a former Head of Banking Supervision at the Bank of
England, characterized the U.K. bank supervisory system as "personal,
participative, progressive and flexible." 1 24 In explaining that statement, W.
P. Cooke, the incumbent official, has observed that U.K. bank supervision
emphasizes frequent and extensive discussions between the Bank of England and the senior management of commercial banks. A fundamental
precept of the Bank of England's approach to supervision is that the banking

122. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3901(a)(2), 3901(b) (Supp. 1985). 12 U.S.C. § 3901(b) provides that:
"The Federal banking agencies shall consult with the banking supervisory authorities of other
countries to reach understandings aimed at achieving the adoption of effective and consistent
supervisory practices with respect to international lending."
123. C. Blackhurst, What Lurks Behind U.K. Bank Supervision?, 4 INT'L. FIN. L. REV. 5
(Feb. 1985).
124. G. Blunden, cited in a speech delivered by W. P. Cooke, Associate Director and Head
of Banking Supervision, Bank of England, The Ernest Sykes Memorial Lecture, Institute of
Bankers, Apr. 26, 1983, at 6.
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system should be able, subject to the satisfaction of basic prudential guidelines, to accommodate rather than restrict different kinds of banking business. In Cooke's words,
We have a supervisory system with authorization deriving from statute but the
running of the system still depending to a large degree on moral suasion. Powers
exist to reinforce the system, but not so draconian as to leave no room for debate,
reasoned discussion and persuasion-of banks by supervisors and vice-versa. 125
Recently, the application of this basic supervisory philosophy has been
criticized. While emphasizing that the flexibility of the present system
should be retained, a committee (the 1985 Review Committee) chaired by
the Governor of the Bank of England identified some specific areas for
change. The 1985 Review Committee recommended an improvement in the
"capacity of the supervisors to exercise the crucial qualitative judgments on
the management, the loan books, the adequacy of capital and other ele' 126
ments of the business of banks which they are supervising."
The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) was the background
factor supporting the work of the 1985 Review Committee. At the time of its
collapse, JMB was one of five major participants in the sensitive and
influential London gold market. Because the major participants in the
London market do a substantial amount of business with each other, the
failure of any of them affects the entire London gold market, which is
arguably the most important in the world. The Bank of England intervened
and subsequently took over JMB because of its belief that the pressures
likely to have been put on the other four members of the market could
quickly have been transmitted to other banks in the United Kingdom and
abroad.1 27 One editorial concluded that "it is hard to avoid the conclusion
that the crash of [JMB] was a disaster that was waiting to happen in the
context of the Bank of England's slow-moving and insensitive supervisory
system."

128

125. Id., at 9. One study raised some questions about the Bank of England's powers of
"moral suasion." WILSON, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE FUNCTIONING OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

1262 (June 1980) (Chairman: The Right Honourable Sir Harold

Wilson) [hereinafter cited as the WILSON REPORT]. The Wilson Report stated that "serious
concern has ... been expressed in evidence to us that the close relationship of the Bank to
market participants may, on occasion, conflict with its obligation to provide disinterested
advice to government."
126. Report of the Committee Set Up to Consider the System of Banking Supervision,
Presented to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Command of Her Majesty, at 3
(London, 1985) [hereinafter cited as the "1985 Review Committee Report"].
127. David Lascelles and Peter Riddell, Britain to Strengthen Bank Supervision after JMB
Collapse, Fin. Times, June 21, 1985, at 1.
128. Editorial, A Failure of Supervision, Fin. Times, June 21, 1985, at 16.
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1. The U.K. Banking Act
The Banking Act of 1979 (the U.K. Banking Act), 29 which for the first
time provided a statutory basis for banking supervision within the United
Kingdom, was drafted in response to the so-called "secondary banking
crisis" of 1973-1974130 and the harmonization requirements of the 1977
EEC Banking Directive.' 31 Prior to the passage of the U.K. Banking Act,
the Bank of England had exercised its supervisory role largely on the basis of
tradition. The U.K. Banking Act imposes on the Bank of England primary
responsibility for regulating and supervising recognized banks and licensed
deposit-takers, which are treated quite differently by the statutory
scheme. 132 The U.K. Banking Act provides only the basic outlines of a
supervisory framework and its generality is clearly by design. In commenting on the proposed act in 1978, a representative of the Bank of England
stated that, "The existing pattern of banking supervision has major elements which in the Bank's view have proved their worth within the structure
of the U.K. financial system and it is intended that the proposed
new
133
statutory framework should enable them to be preserved.'
Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson has recently introduced a bill
in Parliament to strengthen the supervisory framework first established by
the U.K. Banking Act. The proposed measures were based upon the recommendations made by the 1985 Review Committee and include a number of
significant changes. Among the major reforms to be considered are the end
of the two tier system of "recognized banks" and "licensed deposit-takers"
and the establishment of a regular dialogue between the Bank of England
and bank auditors.' 34 As explained below, bank auditors may not at present
communicate directly with the Bank of England because of the confidentiality clause of the Banking Act. 135 Other proposed changes include limits on
banks' exposures to single borrowers and strengthening internal control and
reporting requirements.
129. The text of the U.K. Banking Act is set forth in I. MORISON, P. TILLETT AND J. WELCH,
THE BANKING ACT OF 1979 (London: 1979); see also THE BANKING ACT OF 1979 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979) and HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (cum. supp. 1984).

130. See The Secondary Banking Crisis and the Bank of England's Support Operations, 18
BANK OF ENGLAND 0. BULL. 230 (1978).
131. Council Directive of the European Communities (77/780/EEC), Dec. 12, 1977. The
1977 directive related to the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions for
credit institutions of member states.
132. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 58; WELCH, J. (ed.), THE REGULATION OF

BANKS INTHE MEMBER STATES OF THE EEC, at 229 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Welch]. For a
description of the differences between recognized banks and licensed deposit-taking institutions, see K. PEASNELL & C.W.R. WARD, BRITISH FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS

(London, 1985) 162-167.
133. Blackhurst, supra note 123, at 6.
134. G. Matthews, New British Bank Legislation, AM. BANKER, June 21, 1985, at 2.
135. See C. Wolman, Bank Calls For Wider Disclosure By Auditors, Fin. Times, Aug. 21,
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2. The Bank of England and H.M. Treasury
The Bank of England has a very wide range of functions, perhaps broader
than those of the central bank of any of the other creditor countries discussed here.136 Pursuant to the Bank of England Act of 1946 (the Bank of
England Act), the Bank of England has extensive powers to request information from and make recommendations to banks, and may, with the
consent of H.M. Treasury, issue directions137to any bank to effect compliance
with such a request or recommendation.
Pursuant to the terms of the U.K. Banking Act, the powers of the Bank of
England are quite different with respect to the two categories of "recognized
banks" and "licensed deposit-takers." A more rigorous scheme of supervision applies to licensed deposit-taking institutions. For example, section 16
of the U.K. Banking Act empowers the Bank of England to require licensed
deposit-takers to provide "such information as the Bank may reasonably
require about the nature and conduct of the institution's business and its
plan for future development." 138Moreover, section 17 of the U.K. Banking
Act permits the Bank of England to appoint investigators "to investigate
and report to the Bank on the ...

conduct of the business of the139
bank or

institution concerned, or any particular aspect of that business.
In practice, the Bank of England supervises banks by obtaining regular
and detailed information on individual banks' balance sheets and profit and
loss accounts rather than through on-site examinations. This information
provides the basis for regular prudential discussions with the senior management of commercial banks on the conduct of their business. 140 Over time,
each bank develops an individual relationship with the Bank of England.
"Flexibility" and "accessibility" are words often used to describe the Bank
of England's regulatory philosophy.141
The Bank of England is owned by H.M. Treasury, which is also a part of
the general supervisory framework. 142 The Bank of England Act gives H.M.
1985, at 7. In accordance with the Chancellor of the Exchequer's proposals, a statement
released by the Bank of England on Aug. 20, 1985 details seven types of "dialogue" which bank
supervisors should be empowered to conduct with bank auditors.
136. WILSON REPORT, supra note 125, at 1260. The Bank of England is managed by a Court
of Directors comprised of the Governor, Deputy Governor and sixteen directors, all of whom
are appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister.
137. WELCH, supra note 132, at 228. The influence of "moral suasion" by the Bank of
England is such that "this power to give a direction has never been used, and indeed the Bank
has never explicitly based any request or recommendation on the [Bank of England Act]." Id.

138. U.K. Banking Act, section 16(1)(a).
139. U.K. Banking Act, supra note 129, at section 17(1).
140. FRB, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BANK SUPERVISION IN THE

GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND

SWITZERLAND (1984) [hereinafter cited as BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN], at 98-99.

141. Blackhurst, supra note 123, at 6.
142. In exercising its supervisory duties under the Banking Act, the Bank of England reports
to Parliament through the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
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Treasury a general right to issue directives to the Bank of England when
H.M. Treasury believes that the public interest demands such action. This
power has never been used, but it is the underlying basis of the Bank of
England's ultimate subordination to the government. 143 In Parliament, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer is required to answer questions relating to the
Bank of England. This is the basis of the requirement in the U.K. Blnking
Act that the Bank of England prepare annual reports for presentation to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. While H.M. Treasury is not involved in the
day-to-day operations of the Bank of England, the public expects it to have
answers to questions relating to the Bank of England in a crisis situation.
3. Commercial Banks and
the Supervisory Process

U.K. commercial banks generally anticipate increased supervision of
their international lending policies by the Bank of England in the near
future. 44 One prominent commercial banker has stated that, "the current
difficulties faced by U.S. and European banks must increase the prospect of
further moves by regulators, particularly in relation to international lending
and provisions against doubtful loans." 45 Commercial bank officials typically express a very high regard for the Bank of England and tend to view
supervision and regulation as a joint and cooperative matter. 146 With respect to international lending, commercial banks view their own internal
controls as strict and also emphasize that the Bank of England has performed a particularly useful role by "persuading" banks to follow prudent
policies rather than by "imposing" specific requirements. They often contrast this approach with the rule-based regulatory system of the United
States. 147
4. Accounting and Disclosure Requirements

In the U.K., accounting rules apply uniformly to all banks and companies
and there are no special rules for banks. The form and content of financial
143. WILSON REPORT, supra note 125, at 1264. In certain of its roles, the Bank of England
acts as the agent of H.M. Treasury, either under explicit statutory authority or by long-standing
convention. Of course, in other matters, primarily those stemming from its function as banker
to commercial banks, the Bank of England acts as principal. WILSON REPORT, supranote 125, at
1265.
144. Interviews with senior officials of major commercial banks, London, Jan. 19, 20, 23, 24
and 27, 1984; May 28 and 29, 1985 (notes on file with author). Interviews with officials in the
U.K., as well as in other countries whose supervisory policies are discussed herein, were
conducted on a confidential basis.
145. T. H. Bevan, Speech, Oct. 1982, reprinted in 58 BARCLAYS REV. 13 (1983). Bevan also
expressed the view that supervision in relation to levels of country risk exposure was likely to
increase. Id. at 14.
146. Interviews, supra note 144.
147. Id.
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statements of banks are governed by: (1) the Companies Acts, (2) so-called
Statements of Standard Accounting Practices (SSAPs) developed by va48
rious professional accounting bodies, and (3) banking industry custom. 1
Requirements in the Companies Acts were never drawn up with the specific
case of banks in mind and there are, to date, no SSAPs that relate specifically to' banks. Banking industry custom has been tolerant of varying
approaches and49the result has been "widely differing levels of disclosure"
among banks. 1
Of the three sources of influence on the presentation of financial information noted above, the Companies Acts have been the primary source of
diverse regulatory standards. Previously, pursuant to the Companies Act
1981, all recognized banks and licensed deposit-taking institutions could
choose to prepare accounts either in accordance with the rules of Schedule 1
to the Companies Act 1981 or the older rules set forth at Schedule 8A to the
Companies Act 1948. Schedule 8A was the more popular approach because
it permitted some banks to utilize a number of disclosure options, including
non-disclosure of certain movements in their reserves and changes in the
market value of listed investments. The Companies Act 1985, effective July
1, 1985, attempts to apply more uniform accounting 50standards for recognized banks and licensed deposit-taking institutions.1
The U.K. Banking Act states that (in cases of apparent serious financial
difficulties in a bank) the Bank of England may appoint competent persons
to investigate its business. 151 Banks, like all other registered companies in
the United Kingdom, must file copies of their annual financial accounts with
the Registrar of Companies.152 The U.K. Banking Act further requires all
copies of their most recent audited accounts for public
banks to maintain
153
inspection.
U.K. accounting and disclosure rules have been criticized sharply by some
observers.' 5" One stated shortcoming is that while audited accounts play a
prominent role in U.K. supervision, the Bank of England cannot, in the
absence of special circumstances, discuss an auditor's report directly with
the auditor who prepared it. Moreover, because of the confidentiality

148. INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS, BANKS: AN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING GUIDE

27 (1983) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS].

149. Id.
150. Companies Act 1985, II PALMER'S COMPANY L. REP. (London); INSTITUTE OF
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 148.
151. U.K. Banking Act, supra note 129, at section 17(t); BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF

TEN, supra note 140, at 99.
152. The Companies Act of 1985 requires all companies incorporated in the United Kingdom, including banks, to prepare an annual consolidated balance sheet and a statement of
income.
153. U.K. Banking Act, supra note 129, at sec. 15(1).
154. Blackhurst, supra note 123, at 9-10.
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requirements of section 19 of the U.K. Banking Act, the Bank of England is
at present unable to mediate between a bank and its auditors.' 55 One
suggestion for overcoming these alleged supervisory shortcomings is the
56
introduction of an independent central auditing authority.
A number of reforms in auditing practice were recommended by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in a presentation to the 1985 Review
Committee, including the following: (1) a formal relationship should be
established between auditors and the Bank of England; (2) auditors may be
required to discuss clients' affairs with the Bank of England if that supervisory authority would in turn disclose relevant information to the auditors;
(3) some of the prudential and statistical returns that are made to the Bank
of England should be audited; (4) the Banking Supervision Department of
the Bank of England should employ on its permanent staff more professionally qualified accountants; and (5) under appropriate circumstances, the
Bank of England should be able to obtain special reports from a bank's
1 57
auditors.
B.

REGULATIONS AND RATIOS

1. Loans to Single Borrowers
Each bank is expected to report to the Bank of England, on a quarterly
basis, its ten largest loans (including guarantees) to single borrowers. While
there are no statutory limits on the amount of loans that a bank may extend
to any one borrower, the Bank of England has stated that such loans should
not normally exceed ten percent of a bank's capital. The Bank of England
has further stated that in cases where this ten percent guideline is exceeded,
it will expect that correspondingly stronger capital adequacy ratios be

maintained.

158

While rejecting formal limits, the 1985 Review Committee has recommended some changes in supervisory practices relating to loans to single
borrowers. Each bank would be required to set forth in writing a policy

155. Section 19(3) of the U.K. Banking Act would permit such discussions and disclosure if
the Bank of England determines that this is necessary to enable it "properly to discharge any of
its functions under this Act."
156. Blackhurst, supra note 123, at 10.
157. Recommendations (1) through (5) are set forth in numbered paragraphs 12, 13, 20, 34
and 17 to 19, respectively, of the INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS, REVIEW OF BANKING
SUPERVISION (London, Mar. 1985).
158. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OFTEN, supra note 140, at 97. In the words of the Bank

of England's Notice to Institutions Authorized Under the Banking Act of 1979, dated Apr.
1983, "the more an individual exposure exceeds 10 percent of the capital base, the more
rigorous the Bank will be in requiring justification. If loans in excess of 10 percent of the capital
base have been or are to be made, the institution will normally be requested to maintain a level
of capital resources significantly higher than that which would otherwise be required."
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adopted by its board of directors with respect to large exposures. The 1985
Review Committee stated that factors such as a long-standing relationship
with a borrower, particular expertise in a certain type of lending and the
security for the loan would be factors taken into account when considering
levels of exposure up to twenty-five percent of capital. Large exposure loans
59
extended to related borrowers were generally to be strongly discouraged. 1
2. Capital Adequacy
The Bank of England takes the position that to prescribe a precise
numerical guideline for the capital needs of all institutions or even for
groups of institutions would be inappropriately inflexible. However, it has
devised two capital ratios which are used as a basis for assessing capital
adequacy after considering the circumstances of a particular bank. The
"gearing ratio" relates the capital base to all other non-capital liabilities
apart from contingent liabilities. The "risk assets ratio" tests the adequacy
of capital in relation to the risk of losses that may be sustained. Various
classes of assets are weighted according to their supposed susceptibility to
credit, investment and forced sale risk. The risk assets ratio is calculated by
multiplying each balance sheet asset by its weight to produce an adjusted
total of risk assets which is then related to the capital base. 160 It is significant
that information concerning an individual bank's gearing ratio or risk assets
ratio is not publicly disclosed. This confidential treatment reflects the view
of the Bank of England that each bank should be treated on an individual
basis. 161

The treatment of subordinated debt instruments as elements of a bank's
secondary or external capital base has been a matter of some recent concern
for the Bank of England. It has stated that an issue of perpetual debt can be
structured in such a way as to give it certain characteristics of capital which
make it closer to equity than subordinated debt of a given maturity. In the
Bank's view, subordinated debt would not qualify as part of a bank's capital
base 'if there are any provisions in the related loan agreement which trigger
early repayment. As a further condition, the loan documentation must state
that no early repayment can be made without the Bank's consent and that an
interpretation of the terms and conditions applying to loan capital will be
subject to English law. So-called perpetual subordinated debt satisfies the
Bank of England's criteria. Such debt has no final maturity date and appears

159. 1985 Review Committee Report, supra note 126, at 11-12.
160. DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 58-59; Bank of England, The Measurement
of Capital (Sept. 5, 1980), reprinted in 20 BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL. 324-330 (1980); WELCH,
supra note 132, at 238-239.
161.

Blackhurst, supra note 123, at 9.
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sufficiently close to equity in terms of the protection it affords depositors to
62
rank paripassu with equity for capital adequacy measurement purposes. 1
The Bank of England has also focused attention on a range of off balance
sheet risks to which banks may be exposed. In a policy statement released on
April 3, 1985, the Bank of England expressed particular concern over the
nature of obligations assumed by institutions which act as underwriters of
note issuance facilities or revolving underwriting facilities (NIFs and
RUFs). In the Bank's view, these obligations represent a long-term credit
risk for an underwriting institution. The Bank of England therefore decided, as a provisional measure, to treat all such obligations as contingent
liabilities for capital adequacy purposes and to include them in the calculation of a bank's risk asset ratio. 163
3. Liquidity

In developing its guidelines on liquidity, the Bank of England emphasized
its intention that banks apply a prudent combination of liquidity measures
appropriate to their circumstances. 164 Liquidity assessment is to take
account of "funding risk" which is the possibility of not having available
sufficient cash to meet obligations falling due on a particular day, as well as
"interest rate mismatch risk" through which a bank may suffer losses due to
movements in interest rates. Liquidity measurement is based on a cash flow
approach. Liabilities and assets are matched on a "maturity ladder" with the
net positions in each time period being accumulated. The measure is a series
of accumulating net mismatch positions in successive time periods.1 65 Liquidity positions of individual banks are not publicly disclosed.' 6
4. Foreign Currency Exposure

The Bank of England distinguishes between "structural" and "dealing"
positions. Dealing positions are comprised of foreign exchange exposures
resulting from normal banking operations while structural positions are
foreign currency exposures intended to be of a longer-term nature because
they arise from fixed long-term assets and liabilities. Structural positions are
excluded from foreign exchange guidelines agreed upon between the Bank
of England and each bank but are included in calculating capital adequacy
162. W. P. Cooke, Some Current Concerns: Remarks at the Arab Bankers Association
Conference on Banking Control and Supervision (May 7, 1985); see, generally, Bank of
England, Statement on Subordinated Capital Issued by Recognized Banks and Licensed
Deposit-Takers (Nov. 28, 1984).
163. Bank of England, Statement on Off Balance Sheet Risks: Note Issuance Facilities,
Revolving Underwriting Facilities (Apr. 3, 1985).
164. Bank of England, The Measurement of Liquidity (July 20, 1982), reprinted in 22 BANK
OF ENGLAND 0. BULL. 399-402 (1982).
165. Id.; DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 59-60.
166. Blackhurst, supra note 123, at 9.
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ratios. As general guidelines, the Bank of England would expect net open
dealing positions in any one currency to be not more than ten percent of a
bank's adjusted capital base and net short open dealing positions in all
currencies taken together to be not more than fifteen percent of the adjusted
167
capital base.
C.

SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING

1. Country Risk and Provisionsfor Loan Losses
The Bank of England does not set formal limits or standards for lending to
particular countries.168 However, it does collect and analyze information
which enables it to form an independent judgment about the risks of lending
to particular countries. Country exposure of banks under its supervision is
monitored by the Bank of England on a fully consolidated basis. Banks are
required to submit monthly returns and more complete reports every six
months detailing their loans to non-residents of the U.K. by borrower type
(i.e., industrial sector, agricultural sector, etc.), country of borrower and
maturity, with supplementary information to be provided for any guarantees. 169 This information is used as the basis of an independent assessment
by the Bank of England of a bank's internal loan portfolio. While aggregate
country risk exposure information is published four times a year by the Bank
of England, information on the country risk exposure of individual banks is
generally not made available to the public.
There are no special requirements that banks make specific provisions
against loan losses. The management of each bank is responsible for determining the appropriate level of provisions needed against loans to countries
which have rescheduled, or are in the course of rescheduling, their external
debt. Moreover, the existence of such provisions would be considered in

167. Bank of England, Foreign Currency Exposure (Apr. 24, 1981); reprinted in 21
ENGLAND

Q.

BULL.

235-237 (1981);

DALE, BANK SUPERVISION,

BANK OF

supra note 62, at 60-61; BANK

supra note 140, at 98.
168. A study by a parliamentary committee in the United Kingdom was critical of the bank
supervisory system in this area: ".. . in view of the evidence that banks unduly relaxed their
traditional standards of prudence in their international risk lending without being brought into
line by the official supervisory authorities, we are not wholly satisfied with present arrangements for bank supervision." HOUSE OF COMMONS, TREASURE AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE
(Session 1982-1983). INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS; INTERNATIONAL LENDING BY
BANKS, VOL. 1 (Fourth Report) Mar. 15, 1983 at xli. [hereinafter cited as Fourth Report].
169. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 97-98; DALE, BANK
SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 60; see also Fourth Report, supra note 168, at 153-154. Among
the recommendations of the Fourth Report was that United Kingdom banks should disclose
much more information about the general position of their lending to sovereign countries. The
Fourth Report noted that U.K. banks were much more secretive than their counterparts in the
United States.
SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN,
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determining capital adequacy ratios. General
provisions against loan losses
1 70
base.
capital
the
of
part
as
treated
are
Disclosure in financial statements of information about bad and doubtful
loan provisions is also viewed as a matter for determination by individual
banks. Only the clearing banks and a few71 others regularly provide such

information in their financial statements.1
2. Lender of Last Resort

The Bank of England would consider acting as lender of last resort in
exceptional cases of liquidity difficulties confronted by banks under its
supervision.1 72 There is also a well established tradition in the United

Kingdom that in a financial crisis, the Bank of England will cooperate with
the major commercial banks to manage the problem. 173 An example of such

assistance was the "lifeboat" formed in 1973 to deal with the so-called
"secondary banking crisis" in London.

174

The JMB affair suggests, how-

ever, that the Bank of England might choose to intervene less in the future
unless there is once again such a widespread crisis as occurred in 1973. The
Bank of England only intervened in the case of JMB in view of the role JMB
had in the gold market. The Bank of England is unwilling to state definitely
that its lender of last resort function extends to the foreign network of the
parent banks under its supervision. United Kingdom branches and sub-

sidiaries of foreign banks are 75viewed as the responsibility of the parent

bank's supervisory authority.
Sections 21 to 33 of the U.K. Banking Act provide for the introduction of

a mandatory deposit insurance scheme. Under the new arrangements,
which became effective in February 1982, seventy-five percent of a deposi-

170. INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 148, at 129.

171. Id.
172. Interviews with senior officials of the Bank of England, London (Jan. 17, 1984 and May
30, 1985) (notes on file with author). The Bank of England views the potential provision of
liquidity support in carefully analyzed and appropriate circumstances as part of its general
responsibility for the management of money markets in the United Kingdom and for the
conduct of monetary policy. Solvency difficulties of individual institutions are less clearly
covered. Presumably, solvency problems would trigger the deposit insurance scheme which
became operative in Feb. of 1982. Under that plan, deposits up to 10,000 pounds sterling in a
banking institution subject to the U.K. Banking Act are covered by mandatory insurance. The
Deposit Protection Fund is financed by contributions from participating banks. Actual provision of insurance coverage could not be expected until a covered banking institution failed.
BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 101. See also U.K. Banking Act,

supra note 138, at secs. 21-33.
173. Sir Jeremy Morse, Chairman, Lloyds Bank, A British View of the International Debt
Problem (Mimeo) (Aug. 1983).
174. See, M. REID, THE SECONDARY BANKING CRISIS 1973-1975 (1983).

175. Interviews with senior officials of the Bank/of England, London (Jan. 17, 1984 and May
30, 1985) (notes on file with author); DALE, BANK SUPERVISION supra note 62.
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tor's so-called "protected deposit" is insured. A protected deposit is limited
to ten thousand pounds sterling per depositor per institution. 176
3. Treatment of Branches and Subsidiaries of
U.K. Banks OperatingAbroad
Pursuant to general rules of consolidated returns, prudential guidelines
and reporting requirements apply to branches and majority-owned subsidiaries of U.K. banks operating abroad. Commercial banks and the Bank
of England agree that the lending policies of such entities are the responsibility of U.K. headquarters. 1 77 Of course, such branches and subsidiaries
would also be subject to the requirements of the countries in which they are
located.
4. Treatment of Foreign Banks
in the U.K.
The general rule is that the treatment of a foreign bank operating a
subsidiary in the U.K. is to be no different from that of a domestic bank.
While in some cases the Bank of England might give consideration to the
reputation and standing of the parent, subsidiaries of foreign banks must
apply to receive deposit-taking authorization in their own right. Foreign
banks operating subsidiaries in the U.K. are expected to provide assurances
to the Bank of England that they acknowledge responsibility for deposits at
such institutions. 178
Branches of foreign banks are treated somewhat differently. Authorization to conduct a banking business is granted to the organization as a whole
rather than to the branch. Branches are not required to have separate capital
and are not subject to capital adequacy requirements.' 79 The Bank of
England has recently stated that it intends to extend the range of statistical
information collected from branches of foreign banks in order to make it
more uniform with information collected from institutions incorporated in
the U. K.18so The Bank of England also intends to interview the management
of such branches with respect to the conduct of branch operations more
frequently than it has in the past.' 8' Moreover, in the area of contingent

176. U.K. Banking Act, supra note 129, at sec. 29.
177. Interviews with senior officials of the Bank of England, London (Jan. 17, 1984 and May
30, 1985); interviews with senior officials of commercial banks, London (Jan. 19, 20, 23 and 24,
1984; May 28 and 29, 1985) (notes on file with author).
178. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supranote 140, at 93-94. See also Bird, United
Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING supra note 115, at 6.
179. Id.
180. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 99.
181. Id.; Hughes, U.K. Acts on Overseas Bank Rules, Fin. Times, June 5, 1984, at 16. In a

letter sent on June 4, 1984, to United Kingdom branches of foreign banks, the Bank of England
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liabilities, the Bank of England has stated that it wishes to monitor branches'
18 2
activities as underwriters of note issuance facilities.
5. Attitudes Towards InternationalCooperation
The following statement by a Bank of England official illustrates the ad
hoc approach favored by most supervisory officials and commercial bank
representatives in the U.K.:
I am not persuaded that the market mechanisms, supplemented by IMF programmes and official support, could not themselves develop and adjust, given time,
ingenuity and the will to succeed. Already the bankers are showing awareness of
the problems created by the bunching of maturities . . . the new relationships,

which have emerged between
commercial banks, borrowers and the IMF are also
83
capable of development.
Among central banks, the Bank of England has played a particularly
influential role in encouraging international cooperation among supervisory
authorities. Attitudes towards appropriate measures to resolve the debt
crisis have been strongly influenced by the work of the Cooke Committee in
the development of the Basle Concordat. The emphasis of the Basle Concordat, as revised in 1983, on consolidated supervision and preventing gaps
in the supervisory framework has been reflected in the public statements of
the Bank of England.
IV. Bank Regulation and Supervision
in the Federal Republic of Germany

A.

GENERALLY

Bank supervision in the Federal Republic of Germany reflects the dominance of the largest commercial banks. 184 The Federal Bank Supervisory
Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt ffir das Kreditwesen) (the FBSO) has primary
responsibility for the supervision of banks, but it exercises its supervisory
powers in close cooperation with the Bundesbank.1 85 The authority of the
FBSO and the Bundesbank, the central bank, is very broad and their powers
to request relevant information from banks are extensive. The Bundesbank
has a relatively large supervisory staff and the FBSO, despite its location in
stated that it needed to "enhance the depth and detail" of its knowledge of branch operations of
foreign banks in the United Kingdom.
182. Bank of England, Statement on Off Balance Sheet Risks, supra note 163.
183. Quinn, InternationalDebt: A Central Banker's View, 23 BANK OF ENGLAND 0. BULL.
544, 545 (1983).
184. The so-called "Big Three" banks include Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and
Commerzbank. The focus of this analysis is on commercial banks because of their role in
international lending. However, the public savings banks and the credit cooperatives constitute
two other powerful banking sectors, which have also been involved in international lending
activities.
185. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 134.
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Berlin, rather than in the Frankfurt financial center, commands consider-

able respect and deference from banks subject to its supervision. The bank
supervisory system is rule-based, but the prevailing assumption among
commercial bankers is that rules are to be closely and carefully read and then

interpreted narrowly. Until recently, the lack of consolidated reporting
requirements made lending through German subsidiaries abroad an easy
way to circumvent limits on loans to single borrowers as well as capital
86

adequacy requirements.

1. The German Banking Act

The basic law is the Banking Act of July 10, 1961 (Gesetz iber das
Kreditwesen). It has been amended several times, with the most important
changes being introduced by the so-called "Second Law," effective on May

1, 1976,187 and by the recently adopted German Banking Act Amendments
(as so amended, the Gesetz iber das Kreditwesen is referred to herein as
German Banking Act). 188 The organization, structure and functions of the
Bundesbank are governed by the Bundesbank Act of 1957, as amended (the

Bundesbank Act).' 8 9

The Bundesbank Act defines the role of the Bundesbank with respect to

the federal government. The Bundesbank's primary responsibility is for the
day-to-day management of the money supply. While the Bundesbank is
obliged to support the general economic policy of the government, its
186. Present bank supervisory arrangements reflect a number of reforms introduced after
the Herstatt crisis. The Herstatt failure was due in large measure to mismanagement of foreign
exchange transactions and reform efforts were subsequently directed at supervising the international sector of the German banking industry. Other reforms introduced after Herstatt included
an extended deposit protection scheme and measures to encourage risk-spreading in lending.
An independent Commission of Inquiry on Basic Banking Questions (the so-called "Gessler
Commission") was established to look into the sructure of the banking industry and consider
the capital adequacy situation of German banks. More recently, measures to tighten banking
regulation, have resulted from the situation in the fall of 1983 at Schroder, Munchmeyer,
Hengst (SMH).
187. The authoritative text of the Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen was first published in the
Federal Gazette on July 10, 1961 and was significantly amended on Dec. 14, 1976; for a good
general introduction to bank regulation in the Federal Republic of Germany, see H.
SCHNEIDER, H-J. HELLWIG and D. KINGSMAN, THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM (1978) (hereinafter cited as SCHNEIDER, HELLWIG, KINGSMAN]. One significant feature of the 1976 amendments
to the German Banking Act was the revision of provisions limiting large loans to single
borrowers (Article 13). Other important changes included increased reporting obligations of
banks (Article 24), enlarged rights of intervention by supervisory authorities (Articles 35(2)
and 44) and the granting of a controlling role to supervisory authorities in the case of actual and
imminent bank failures (Articles 46-46c). See id. at 10.
188. The German Banking Act Amendments became effective on Jan. 1, 1985. They
followed many of the proposals set forth in the Ministry of Finance Bill, Feb. 24, 1984,
Bundesrat-Drucksache 60/84. For a summary of key provisions of the German Banking Act
Amendments, see Nissen, Stricter Controls on Lending by German Banks and Their Foreign
and Domestic Subsidiaries, WORLDLAW, July-Aug. 1984, at 12 [hereafter cited as Nissen].
189. Gesetz iber die Deutsche Bundesbank, July 26, 1957, as amended May 23, 1975.
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independence is guaranteed by a provision in the Bundesbank Act which
states that in case of a conflict with the Bundesbank's primary role (as
indicated in the Bundesbank Act), the Bundesbank's legal duties take
90
precedence.'
2. The FBSO and the Bundesbank
Although it operates with a great deal of independence, the FBSO comes
within the general responsibility of the Minister of Finance and is theoretically subject to his instructions.' 9 ' The FBSO is charged with supervising
banks in accordance with the provisions of the German Banking Act.' 92 In
addition, it is the duty of the FBSO to "prevent abuses in the banking system
which might endanger the security of the assets entrusted to banks, adversely affect the orderly conduct of the banking business, or substantially
prejudice the economy generally." 93 Regulations on such matters as capital
adequacy and liquidity are issued by the FBSO after it has obtained the full
94
agreement of the Bundesbank. 1
The German Banking Act specifies that the FBSO and the Bundesbank
are to cooperate in performing their duties.' 95 Typically, various reports
submitted by German commercial banks are collected and evaluated by the
Bundesbank and then given to the FBSO, which is responsible for taking
any appropriate supervisory steps.196 The Bundesbank also has monetary
and economic policy functions. It is expected to cooperate with the Ministry
of Finance in furnishing information and giving advice on matters affecting
economic policy. 197 The Bundesbank also has the duty "to regulate ... the
circulation of money and the supply of credit to the economy with the aim of
safeguarding the currency, and to provide for normal banking clearance of
payment transactions within the Federal Republic of Germany and with
98
foreign countries."'
3. Commercial Banks and
the Supervisory Process
One study has concluded that "the prevalent pattern of interaction between large German banks and their government on matters of mutual
international concern has been one of quiet consensus, enhanced by official
sensitivity to the banks' financial interests and the banks' responsiveness to
190. Epperlein, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 115, at 105.
191. SCHNEIDER, HELLWIG, KINGSMAN, supra note 187, at 34.
192. German Banking Act, art. 6(1).
193. German Banking Act, art. 6(2).
194. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 134.
195. German Banking Act, art. 7.
196. SCHNEIDER, HELLWIG, KINGSMAN, supra note 187, at 35.
197. Id. at 19.
198. Bundesbank Act, art. 3.
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government incentives and suasion."'

99

The FBSO, however, takes issue

with this statement and emphasizes the independence of its supervisory

authority. Commercial banks are consulted in the development and refinement of rules and regulations imposed by the FBSO. Commercial banks
tend to work through the Federal Association of German Banks in developing uniform positions on proposed rules and reporting requirements. 200
Commercial bank officials state that the German system of bank regulation
and supervision is closer to the rule-based system of the U.S. than to the
U.K. system of prudential regulation. However, they also emphasize that
the FBSO and the Bundesbank do not have sufficient staff to carefully
enforce all the rules. Moreover, there is a tendency for both regulators and
commercial banks to interpret rules
narrowly, thus encouraging a certain
20 1
amount of "loophole" discovery.

4. Accounting and Disclosure Requirements
The annual reports submitted to the FBSO by external auditors must
follow specific guidelines for format and content. When auditing a bank's
annual accounts, such external auditors are also required to look generally
into a bank's affairs to ascertain whether it has complied with all applicable
financial and reporting requirements.2 °2 The FBSO is authorized to conduct
on-site examinations of banks, either directly or through appointed auditors. Numerous periodic reports must be submitted to the FBSO and the
Bundesbank and all examiners have full access to depositor and borrower
20 3

records.

Annual financial statements of German banks, including a balance sheet
and a statement of income, must be made available to the public. Generally,
however, reports submitted to the Bundesbank and the FBSO need not be

published. Banks are required to draw up their annual balance sheet and
profit and loss accounts within three months of the end of their accounting
199. SPINDLER, supra note 42, at 181.
200. The Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V. (Federal Association of German Banks),
which is the central organization for private sector credit institutions, has its headquarters in
Cologne. The FBSO often uses the Federal Association of German Banks as a means for
discussion of its directives. Other associations serve other types of banking institutions. For
example, Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband e.V. is the central organization representing
regional savings bank associations. SCHNEIDER, HELLWIG, KINGSMAN, supra note 187, at 22.
201. Interview with senior official of Federal Association of German Banks, Cologne (Feb.
13, 1984); Interviews with senior officials of major commercial banks, Frankfurt (Feb. 15 and
16, 1984, and June 5, 1985), and Munich (Feb. 17, 1984) (notes on file with author).
202. German Banking Act, arts. 27 and 29. Article 29(2) states that "[i]f in the course of his
audit the auditor learns of facts which might warrant the qualification or refusal of the certificate
of audit, endanger the existence of the bank or gravely impair its development, or which
indicate that the managers have seriously violated the law ... he shall report this to the [FBSO]
and the [Bundesbank] immediately."
203. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 43.
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year. They must submit the annual accounts as drawn up and subsequently
also as approved to the FBSO and the Bundesbank. 20 4 An audit of a bank's
annual accounts must be carried out not later than five months after the end
of the accounting year.20 5
B.

REGULATIONS AND RATIOS

1. Loans to Single Borrowers
There are detailed reporting requirements for large loans to single borrowers, whether domestic or foreign. Loans granted to any one borrower
which together exceed fifteen percent of a bank's equity capital must be
reported to the Bundesbank.2 °6 Large loans already reported must be
reported again if they are increased by more than twenty percent of the prior
reported amount. 20 7 Banks are also required to report to the Bundesbank
four times a year those borrowers whose indebtedness amounted to DM one
million or more at any time during the three calendar months preceding the
reporting date.208 As a matter of regular practice, the Bundesbank collects
these reports on large loans and (in summary form) loans of DM one million
or more and sends them with its comments to the FBSO.2 ° 9 In addition, the
FBSO may order banks to submit once a year a list of large loans subject to
210
the reporting requirements.
There are also limits on large loans in relation to a bank's equity capital.
Pursuant to the German Banking Act Amendments no new large loan is
allowed to exceed fifty percent of a bank's capital. Until the recent changes,
no loan could exceed seventy-five percent of a bank's capital. 21 1 The German Banking Act Amendments provide a transition period of five years to
meet the new ceiling for existing loans which are in excess of fifty percent of

204. German Banking Act, art. 26(1).
205. German Banking Act, art. 27(1).
206. German Banking Act, art. 13(1); a "single borrower" covers all enterprises which
belong to the same group of companies or which are linked by agreements providing that the
management of one enterprise is subject to the control of, or its profits are paid to, another
enterprise. German Banking Act, art. 19(2).
207. German Banking Act, art. 13(1).
208. German Banking Act, art. 14(1); Amendment of the Banking Act, BUNDESBANK
MONTHLY REP., Mar. 1985, at 40.
209. The Central Risk Office for Loans of One Million Deutsche Mark or More at the
Deutsche Bundesbank, BUNDESBANK MONTHLY REP., Jan. 1978, at 24-26.

210. German Banking Act, art. 13(1). Under the former law, there were easy ways to avoid
the limitation on large loans because there was no consolidation of large credits on the bank's
side. Thus, a bank could extend a large loan to a borrower through a subsidiary. Nissen, supra
note 188, at 12-13. The German Banking Act Amendments changed this by requiring that all
loans made directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate of which the parent bank controls fifty
percent or more be consolidated. Amendment of the Banking Act, supra note 208, at 37.
211. German Banking Act, art. 13(4).
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capital. The total of all its loans must not exceed eight times a bank's equity
capital.212
2. CapitalAdequacy

Banks are required to maintain an "adequate equity capital" at all
times.213 The FBSO, in agreement with the Bundesbank and after consultation with the Federal Association of German Banks, has announced certain

basic principles, according to which it will normally assess whether a bank's
capital and liquidity are adequate.21 4 Principle I states that the loans and

equity participations of a bank (less provisions for loan losses) must not
exceed eighteen times its capital. 215 Failure to comply with this requirement

creates a rebuttable presumption that the capital of the bank is insufficient
and must be strengthened.216

Recently, the German Banking Act Amendments tightened the implications of the eighteen times capital rule. The changes require German banks
to include figures on their branches and subsidiaries in their regular reports

to insure that the capital in the group as a whole will be measured against the

total risk of the group.2 17 The eighteen times capital rule will be applied to a

bank and its subsidiaries taken as a group. Prior to January 1, 1985 it was
possible for a bank to make multiple use of its capital by establishing
subsidiaries. Each subsidiary was able to extend loans of its own based upon
its own capital. As one commentator noted, "taken together, the risks of the
mother bank and its subsidiaries were able to exceed the eighteen fold limit,
and the result was a series of 'credit pyramids.' ,218

Like banks in a number of other countries, German banks have been
seeking new ways to raise capital. The recently developed "Genusscheine"
or participation certificate is a form of equity recognized by the German
212. German Banking Act, art. 13(3).
213. German Banking Act, art. 10(1): "In the interest of performing their obligations
towards their creditors, particularly in order to safeguard the assets entrusted to them, banking
institutions shall maintain adequate equity capital."
214. See Principles Concerning the Capital and Liquidity of Banks (Grundsatze Ober das
Eigenkapital und die Liquiditat der Kreditinstitute) of Jan. 20, 1969, as amended Jan. 16, 1980
[hereinafter cited as Capital and Liquidity Principles]. General authorization is set forth in the
German Banking Act, arts. 10(l) and 11.
215. "Capital" is defined by the German Banking Act with respect to corporations as paid-in
capital (less own shares), reserves and retained earnings (Article 10). Only reserves which are
derived from after-tax income may be included in capital. "Hidden reserves" are not included
and surbordinated debt is not considered part of equity capital. "Hidden reserves" are created
primarily through the undervaluation of specific assets and are used primarily by bank management to even out fluctuations in earnings. BANK SUPERVISION INTHE GROUP OF TEN, supra note
140, at 42.
216. Capital and Liquidity Principles, supra note 214.
217. Von Wartenberg, West Germany Tightens Its Banking Controls, Wall St. J., Jan. 16,
1985, at 29.
218. Id.
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Banking Act Amendments which can be counted as part of the capital base
for purposes of the eighteen times capital rule provided such instruments do
not exceed 25 percent of capital plus reserves. The Genusscheine gives
bearers the right to a share in bank profits, but not to vote at annual
shareholders' meetings.29

Note issuance facilities (NIFs), revolving underwriting facilities (RUFs)
and other "off balance sheet" financing techniques have also been the
subject of Bundesbank concern. The Bundesbank believes that the danger
of such instruments is that an underwriting bank might have to make good its
credit guarantee at precisely the time when the borrower's status was in
question and no one else would lend to him.2 z°
3. Liquidity
The German Banking Act provides that banks must at all times maintain
sufficient liquidity. 221 The highly complex liquidity rules attempt to keep
long-term assets in a reasonable relationship to long-term financial liabilities
(Principle II) and to limit the use of assets that cannot be mobilized at all
times with relative speed and ease (Principle III).222 Essentially, Principle II
provides that certain long-term and fixed assets must be matched by certain
long-term liabilities.223 Principle III provides standards for a proper relationship between medium-term assets and various short-term and mediumterm liabilities. 22 4 If a bank does not adhere to liquidity guidelines, the
FBSO may require that corrective action be taken.
4. Foreign Exchange Exposure
Principle la provides that a bank's net open positions in foreign currency
and precious metals, irrespective of the maturity date of individual commitments, must not exceed thirty percent of capital and reserves at the close of
business each day. Also on a daily basis, foreign currency positions maturing
in any calendar month or within either half of the calendar year must not
exceed forty percent of capital.225

219. Carr, Commerzbank Seeks DM 425 Million Through Profit-SharingIssue, Fin. Times,
May 20, 1985, at 1. Commerzbank issued DM 425 million in Genusscheine in May 1985.
220. Carr, Bundesbank Warning on Euronote Financing,Fin. Times, Apr. 19, 1985, at 1.
221. German Banking Act, art. 11.
222. Capital and Liquidity Principles; BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note
140, at 40-41; DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 31.

223. Capital and Liquidity Principles, supra note 214.
224. Id.
225. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 41.
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SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING

1. Country Risk and Provisions
for Loan Losses
There are no specific rules relating to country risk and the Bundesbank
and the FBSO do not attempt to provide a comprehensive or independent
view of the financial prospects of individual countries. German commercial
banks, like other German financial institutions, are responsible for independently monitoring and evaluating country risk. Formerly, pursuant to a
so-called "gentlemen's agreement," and, subsequent to July 1, 1986, in
accordance with a legal requirement imposed by the German Banking Act
Amendments, German banks submit to the FBSO and the Bundesbank on a
periodic basis comprehensive consolidated information on country risk. The
purpose is to monitor more effectively the activities of foreign subsidiaries,
particularly Luxembourg subsidiaries through which a substantial portion of
international loans are booked.226 Moreover, pursuant to 1980 guidelines
issued by the FBSO, audit reports must contain detailed information on
country risk. 227
German commercial banks generally have well-developed country risk
analysis procedures and departments. In addition, banks have gradually
been increasing their provisions for loan losses.228 Moreover, a somewhat
greater reliance on government-backed export financing as a percentage of
total foreign lending is viewed as a means of reducing country risk exposure.
German commercial banks readily acknowledge the central and growing
229
role of such "Hermes" covered credits in their total lending picture.
"Hidden reserves" are permitted under German law. Such hidden reserves enable German banks to report steady profits and can be used to
smooth out any fluctuations in earnings. Hidden reserves are built up
through the use of various accounting techniques: (a) the consistent application of codified or generally accepted accounting principles, such as the use
of historic cost accounting rules in a period of inflation; (b) the adoption of
valuation options, such as writing down investments to the lower of cost or

226. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 44.

227. FBSO, Guidelines on Country Risk, 1980.
228. In the past, banks have had some flexibility in deciding which loans require provisions,
but the Bundesbank has begun to take a more conservative position. See Hogan, A Common
Approach is Slow to Emerge, Fin. Times, May 21, 1984, § III (World Banking Survey), at 4.
229. Hermes is a commercial organization largely owned by Munich Re-Insurance and
Allianz Insurance Limited. The slowdown in the German economy and the international debt
situation have caused difficulties for the Hermes scheme. Hermes enjoyed a surplus of DM 34
million in 1982, but lost DM 730 million in 1983 and DM 1.2 billion in 1984. Davies, Export
Credit Insurance, Fin. Times, June 25, 1985, Pt. III (German Banking and Finance).
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market value; and (c) the creation of a general provision for bad debts in
excess of what is reasonably required.23 °
2. Lender of Last Resort

The Bundesbank is the primary source of liquidity for German commercial banks. Policies as to a lender of last resort have been quite heavily
influenced by the Herstatt crisis, as a result of which several banks had to be
given liquidity assistance on an ad hoc basis. Shortly thereafter, the Liquidity Consortium Bank (the Liko-Bank) was established. The Liko-Bank's
sole function is to give assistance to banks that have run into temporary
liquidity difficulties but are otherwise solvent institutions. Some thirty percent of the Liko-Bank's equity capital is subscribed by the Bundesbank. In
addition, the Liko-Bank has been granted a special rediscount ceiling by the
Bundesbank. In practice, the relatively small capital base of the Liko-Bank
limits its assistance to smaller banks and its facilities have been used
infrequently. 23 The Bundesbank is reluctant for prudential reasons to state
clearly its willingness to serve as lender of last resort under various circumstances. The Bundesbank disclaims such responsibility in particular cases
where commercial banks confront true solvency problems.2 32 The Bundesbank emphasizes that it expects German commercial banks to maintain
reserves that would render central bank assistance unnecessary except in the
most generalized and widespread financial crisis.
3. Treatment of Branches and Subsidiaries
of German Banks OperatingAbroad

Prior to the recent adoption of the German Banking Act Amendments,
there were no domestic restrictions on German banks that wished to establish overseas branches or purchase foreign subsidiary banks. Traditionally,
foreign subsidiaries, in particular, were not effectively integrated into the
domestic bank supervisory system.2 33 Only business conducted through a
bank's branches abroad needed to be reported to the FBSO in Berlin. One
result was that a major problem for bank regulators in the Federal Republic
of Germany was the large number of international loans made through
foreign subsidiaries, especially in Luxembourg, that escaped effective
regulation.23 4 Recently adopted rules on consolidation will end the practice
of circumventing domestic regulation by making loans through subsidiaries.

230. Epperlein, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 178, at 111.
231. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 45.

232. Interviewwith senior officials of the Bundesbank, Frankfurt (Feb. 14,1984, and June5,
1985).
233. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 40.

234. Nissen, supra note 188, at 12.
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Pursuant to rules established in accordance with a 1983 European Community Council Directive, commercial banks are now required to file with the
supervisory authorities a consolidated balance sheet covering all subsidiaries in which they have a stake of fifty percent or more. 235 The new rules
also provide for mandatory cooperation between West German bank regulatory authorities and those in other EEC member states. 236 This is the
logical culmination of the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1978, pursuant to
which German banks began voluntarily to submit audit reports covering
their Luxembourg subsidiaries.
A recent Bundesbank report has provided some additional details on the
operation of Luxembourg subsidiaries prior to the adoption of consolidation
requirements. In 1979, all of the Luxembourg subsidiaries recorded aftertax profits, but by 1984 only half of them were profitable. In 1984, West
German banks controlled twenty-six subsidiaries in Luxembourg. According to the Bundesbank report, the Luxembourg subsidiaries made far more
credit available to problem debtor countries than did the parent German
banks.23 7

4. Treatment of Foreign Banks in
the FederalRepublic of Germany
Individual branches of foreign banks must be licensed by the FBSO.
Foreign bank branches are subject to the same conditions and limitations on
their activities as are domestic banks. 238 There are no special rules for banks
owned by foreigners. The German Banking Act Amendments introduced a
reciprocity requirement for the establishment of branches in the Federal
Republic of Germany. A bank license could be denied if there is no reciprocal freedom in the country of origin for a German bank to establish
branches.239

235. See discussion in Nissen, supra note 188, at 12. The impact of the amendments on
German banks will be substantial and they are to be phased in gradually. The consolidated
equity ratios do not have to be met in full until Jan. 1, 1990. The German Banking Act
Amendments had an effective date of Jan. 1, 1985, but the provisions on consolidated reporting
were to become effective on July 1, 1985 and those relating to loans of DM one million or more
were to become effective on July 1, 1986. The consolidation rules are a response to the SMH
crisis as well as to the need to conform to EEC guidelines on consolidation that became effective
in mid-1985. Directive of the Council of the European Communities, June 13, 1983, Official
Gazette ElO, No. L193, at 18.
236. The German Banking Act Amendments specifically authorize German bank regulatory
authorities to transmit all relevant data on banks under their jurisdiction to the regulatory
authorities of other countries. Nissen, supra note 188, at 15.
237. BUNDESBANK MONTHLY REP. Aug. 1985; Carr, West German Bank Profits Plummet in
Luxembourg, Fin. Times, Aug. 16, 1985, at 2.

238.

BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note

239. Nissen, supra note 188, at 15.
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5. Attitudes Towards
InternationalCooperation
The Bundesbank has publicly stated its opposition to a greater role for
international agencies, in general, and the IMF, in particular, as a method of
resolving the debt crisis. In its annual report for 1982, for example, the
Bundesbank stated that it opposed any steps which would lead the IMF in
the direction of taking over or otherwise providing a guarantee of LDC
debt. In the Bundesbank's view, the IMF must not allow itself "to be
seduced either by creditor countries or by commercial banks, into taking
over part of the outstanding debt ' 240 Similarly, Herr Gerhard Stoltenberg,
Finance Minister, has stated that the World Bank should continue to fulfill
its traditional role of lending for specific projects in developing countries
and should not shift its emphasis to more general structural adjustment
programs.24 1
Both the Bundesbank and German commercial banks have supported
greater international cooperation utilizing the present structure of BIS,
IMF, World Bank and central bank relations. One reason to prefer the
status quo is probably to be found in the relatively small West German
banking share in credits extended to Latin American countries. 242 This may
also explain the West German decision (together with a similar Swiss one) to
refuse to take part in the $450 million Argentine debt rescue.24 3 As Dr.
Wilfried Guth (now retired), spokesman for the Board of Directors of
Deutsche Bank, has noted:
One of the most important lessons of this crisis period is the confirmation of the
crucial importance of the [IMF and World Bank]. Rather than pondering over the
need for new institutions, governments and parliaments, we ought to do everything to keep these well-established and highly efficient institutions intact, and to
244
assure the adequacy of their capital base..

240. Bundesbank, Annual Report 1982, cited in Fin. Times, Apr. 15, 1983.
241. Wilkinson, World Bank Should Not Change Its Roles, Fin. Times, Sept. 26, 1984, at 4.
242. The West German share of all commercial bank credits extended in 1984 was as follows:
6.4 percent to Brazil, 4.8 percent to Mexico and 9.3 percent to Argentina. However, West
German banks have put up 19.5 percent of Western credits to the Soviet Union, 25.6 percent to
Poland and 16.5 percent to Yugoslavia. The West German share is also particularly high in the
case of Turkey (33.1 percent) and Nigeria (18.2 percent). Carr, West German Banks Detail
Overseas Loans, Fin. Times, May 21, 1985, at 3.
243. Carr, West Germans, Swiss Refuse to Join $450 Million Argentine Debt Rescue, Fin.
Times, June 11, 1985, at 7.
244. Guth, Challenges to the InternationalFinancialSystem, in 51 ATLANTIC PAPERS 31-32
(September 1983); see also Guth, InternationalDebt Crisis: The Next Phase, 133 THE BANKER 25
(1983); and see Address by H. Linss (Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale), Sovereign Risk
and Lending-Time for Reassessment? Bahrain (Dec. 11-12, 1983). Dr. Linss suggests greater
cooperation between existing international organizations, as well as co-financing with commercial banks by the World Bank. He adds, "I believe that the process of normalization has already
begun."
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V. Bank Regulation and Supervision in Japan
A.

GENERALLY

1. The Japanese Banking Law

The Banking Law of 1927, as amended in 1981 (the Japanese Banking
Law), outlines the basic regulatory framework relating to the conduct of
banking business in Japan. 245 In addition to stating the statutory goals of
facilitating "orderly credit" and "sound and appropriate management of
banking business," the Japanese Banking Law sets forth particular laws for
accounting practices of banks, supervision by the Ministry of Finance, the
merger or acquisition of banks, the conduct of a banking business by the
branches of foreign banks, and certain other matters.2 46 The prototype of
Japan's bank supervisory system is often said to be the United Kingdom
system, with its emphasis on prudence, tradition and consultation rather
than statutes and rules, and a place for the Bank of Japan at the apex of the
financial structure similar to that of the Bank of England.2 47 However, the
recent amendments were intended in part to shift the emphasis away from
administrative guidance towards a more formal regulatory scheme. During
the American occupation after World War II, numerous reforms in the
banking system were introduced and the current supervisory system also
reflects this influence.248
2. The Bank of Japan and
the Ministry of Finance
Article 1 of the Bank of Japan Law states that the Bank of Japan has

responsibility for "the regulation of the currency, the control and facilitation
of credit and finance, and the maintenance and fostering of the credit

system.", 249 Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Bank of Japan has
245. Japanese Banking Law of 1927 (Law No. 21), Mar. 30, 1927, revised in 1981 (Law No.
59), effective Apr. 1, 1982. A number of other laws regulate specific aspects of the banking
business. They include: (a) Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law No. 228 of
1949, as amended, effective Dec. 1, 1980); (b) Foreign Exchange Bank Law (Law No. 67, Apr.
10,1954, as amended, effective Apr. 1, 1963); (c) Securities and Exchange Law; (d) Long-Term
Credit Bank Law (Law No. 187, June 12,1952, as amended, effective Apr. 1, 1962); (e) Bank of
Japan Law (Law No. 67, Feb. 24,1942, as amended, Sept. 1, 1971) (the "Bank of Japan Law").
246. Articles 17 through 23 of the Japanese Banking Law deal with accounting practices;
articles 24 through 29, bank supervision; articles 30 through 36, merger and transfer or
acquisition of operation or business; and articles 47 through 52, branches of foreign banks.
247. FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATIONS OF JAPAN, BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN (1982) at 1
[hereinafter referred to as the FEDERATION REPORT].

248. Following the American pattern, for example, banks were forbidden to engage in
underwriting securities except public bonds and debentures. Japanese Banking Law, art. 10.
See also Japanese Securities and Exchange Law, art. 65.
249. Bank of Japan Law, art. 13, para. 2, provides for the establishment of a Policy Board in
the Bank of Japan. The Policy Board has the duty "to formulate, direct and/or supervise
currency regulation, credit control and other basic monetary policies pertaining to: (1) the
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directed the behavior of Japanese banks on such central matters as interest
rates and lending volume. Through its "window guidance" of banks' re-

quests for funds at its discount window, the Bank of Japan exercises a
control that extends to all aspects of commercial credit and the money

supply. 250 The true basis of the supervisory authority of the Bank of Japan is
its contractual agreements with client banks. Pursuant to these individual
agreements, the Bank of Japan normally conducts biennial examinations of
Japanese commercial banks on a pre-announced basis. 25 '

Real supervisory power in the Japanese banking system, however, resides
in the Ministry of Finance. In contrast to the Bank of Japan's largely
contractual authority, the Ministry of Finance is granted broad supervisory
authority under the Japanese Banking Law. 25 2 One observer has stated that
the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance "incorporate, in U.S. terms,
those of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, SEC, state banking commissions and policy-making responsibilities of the FRB." 2 53 The Ministry of
Finance may, among other powers, require (if it is deemed "necessary to
insure the sound and appropriate management of bank business") a bank to
submit a report on its business activities or financial position.25" The Minis-

try of Finance interprets this power broadly as a basis for general or specific
requests for information from banks under its supervision at any time.25 5
Another powerful supervisory tool of the Ministry of Finance is its ability
to exercise supervision through so-called "administrative guidance" or

guidelines, through which the Ministry of Finance encourages and guides
banks to cooperate voluntarily on matters under its jurisdiction. Essentially,
these are legally nonbinding directives which may be issued either formally

operation of the business of the Bank of Japan..., (2) the functions of the Bank of Japan as the
central bank, and (3) its contractual relations with other financial institutions, so as to meet the
requirements of the national economy." Bank of Japan Law, art. 13, para. 3, specifically
charges the Policy Board with responsibility for "(9) ...such matters of policy pertaining to
credit control and examination of financial institutions as are entrusted to the Policy Board by
virtue of other laws and/or contractual relationships [and] (10) making of annual reports to the
Diet through the competent Minister with respect to: (a) the condition and operation of
financial institutions; (b) necessary changes in laws; (c) changes in supervisory policies...
(d) policy actions taken and the reasons therefor."
250. See Ackley and Ishi, Fiscal, Monetary, and Related Policies, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT: How
THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 290-293 (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976).
251. The Bank of Japan emphasizes that such examinations are carried out quite independently of the Ministry of Finance. The Bank of Japan does not inform the Ministry of Finance
about its findings with respect to particular banks. Interview with senior officials, Bank of
Japan, Tokyo (July 19, 1984) (notes on file with author).
252. Japanese Banking Law, arts. 24-29.
253. Bronte, Inside the Tokyo Ministry of Finance: The Most Powerful Men in Japan,
EUROMONEY, June 1979, at 24.
254. Japanese Banking Law, art. 24(1).
255. Interview with senior officials, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo (July 19, 1984) (notes on file
with author).
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or informally. 2 5 6 In addition, the Ministry of Finance retains broad authority
to issue legally binding banking rules.
3. Commercial Banks and the Supervisory Process

One distinguishing feature of the Japanese banking system is its segmentation into "all-banks," including "city banks," regional banks and trust
banks, long-term credit banks and foreign exchange banks.257 Each banking
type has a specific place in the overall banking system. 258 City banks, which
play a major role in international lending, are generally based in large cities
and operate nationwide through widely distributed branch offices. Longterm credit banks were created in 1952 to assist the then underdeveloped
Japanese capital market by issuing bank debentures. 259 They have subse-

quently become important sources of long-term funds for foreign
borrowers. 260 The Bank of Tokyo, a specialized foreign exchange bank, is
principally engaged in foreign exchange transactions and foreign trade
financing.

26 1

A second distinguishing feature of the Japanese banking system has
been the close relationship between major commercial banks and affiliated
industrial enterprises. Industrial conglomerates (zaibatsu) dominated
Japanese business in the years prior to World War II. While some informal
groupings (keiretsu) have replaced zaibatsu, the traditional close relationship between the major commercial banks and affiliated industrial and
financial entities has remained.26 2
256. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 57. See also SPINDLER, supra

note 42, at 103. Spindler states that "if one takes into account the impact of administrative
guidance, Japanese banks rank among the most intensely supervised in the non-Communist
developed world." Id.
257. Currently, there are thirteen city banks: The Dai Ichi Kangyo Bank, the Fuji Bank, the
Sumitomo Bank, the Sanwa Bank, the Mitsubishi Bank, the Tokai Bank, the Taiyo Kobe
Bank, the Mitsui Bank, the Daiwa Bank, the Kyowa Bank, the Saitoma Bank, the Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank and the Bank of Tokyo (a specialized foreign exchange bank, but also
traditionally numbered among the city banks).
258. The division of the financial marketplace into particular "spheres of interest" has been a
source of controversy in U.S.-Japanese economic relations. It was discussed at length in a
recent joint Japan-United States report on the nature of the Japanese business system and what
steps might be taken to bring Japanese actions more into line with financial practices elsewhere.
259. At present, there are three long-term credit banks: the Industrial Bank of Japan, the
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank.
260. Interview with senior officials of a major long-term credit bank, Tokyo (July 24, 1984)
(notes on file with author).
261. Under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, all foreign exchange
business must be conducted by authorized foreign exchange banks. There are currently 186
authorized foreign exchange banks in Japan, including a specialized foreign exchange bank, the
Bank of Tokyo, and the twelve other city banks. The Foreign Exchange Bank Law authorizes a
specialized foreign exchange bank to issue debentures up to sum of ten times the combined total
of its capital and reserves ("own capital"). Foreign Exchange Bank Law, art. 9, para. 2.
262. Most of the major city banks, with the notable exception of Fuji Bank, are members of
such keiretsu.
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A third factor of great significance is the traditional reliance on "administrative guidance" rather than statutes and formal regulations in the relationship between commercial banks and their supervisors. 263 The influence
of supervisors on bank conduct is very great, and in the words of one
observer: "It is no exaggeration to say that little of consequence happens in
Japan without formal or informal approval from the Ministry of Finance and
sometimes the Bank of Japan. ' ' 264 There has traditionally been a great
to relax
reluctance on the part of the Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance 265
control and their tendency has been to err on the side of caution.
4. Accounting and Disclosure Rules

One result of the new Japanese Banking Law has been the formal adoption of an annual rather than semiannual "business term" or basic accounting period. 266 Pursuant to the so-called "Bank Accounting Standards"
developed by the Ministry of Finance, banks are to account for their business practices in terms of "fairness, clarity, and continuity., 267 Like other
businesses in Japan, banks are subject to the auditing requirements of the
Japanese Commercial Code. A minimum of two auditors and one certified
public accountant must be appointed by each bank, with the auditors being
primarily responsible to bank management and the certified public accountant to a bank's shareholders. Operating pursuant to a contract with a given
bank, auditors are authorized to receive any information deemed necessary
to investigate the financial condition of a bank and are required by law to
report illegal actions to the bank's board of directors. Shareholders regularly appoint a certified public accountant who is responsible for the accuracy of published financial statements.268
The contents of financial statements are governed by the Japanese Banking Law. Article 19 specifies that for each business year, a bank must
prepare and submit to the Ministry of Finance interim and final business

263. See SPINDLER, supra note 42, at 107: "Japanese bank supervision is based fundamentally
on operational understandings, not written rules." See also DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING,
supra note 105, at 113: "The relatively small number of commercial banks has enabled the
authorities to adopt a highly informal approach to bank supervision based on administrative
guidance."

264. Martin, A Cautious Easing of the Straitjacket, Fin. Times, June 1, 1984, at 17.
265. Cottrell, DiversificationAway from the Mainstream, Fin. Times, July 23, 1984, Pt. III:
Japan, at 7.
266. Japanese Banking Law, art. 17, provides that "a bank's business term shall be from
April 1 to March 31 of the next year."
267. FEDERATION REPORT at 107; Ichikawa, Japan in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING

supra note 115, at 259. The Bank Accounting Standards, which are included in the Basic
Circular for Ordinary Banks originally issued on Apr. 1, 1982 (Kuragin No. 901), supplement
the accounting standards for banks set forth in the Banking Laws.
268. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 62.
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reports describing its business activities and financial position.269 More
limited information is required to be submitted to the public. Article 20 of
the Japanese Banking Law requires each bank to compile a balance sheet
and a statement of profits and losses for each business year and make them
public within a three-month period after the end of each business year. In
addition, a kind of abbreviated business report must be prepared for public
perusal at the main office of each bank.270
B.

REGULATIONS AND RATIOS

1. Loans to Single Borrowers
Prior to the effectiveness of the amended Japanese Banking Law on April
1, 1982, controls over large loans by banks to single borrowers were based
on administrative guidance deriving from general supervisory powers
granted to the Ministry of Finance. Article 13 of the Japanese Banking Law
now states that a bank may not grant credit facilities to a single borrower
(and its affiliates) in excess of an amount which is the product of the total of
the bank's capital and reserves (own capital) and a percentage which is
determined by order of the Ministry of Finance.2 71
The Ministry of Finance limits on loans to single borrowers now in effect
are twenty percent of own capital in the case of ordinary commercial banks,
thirty percent for long-term credit banks and forty percent for specialized
foreign exchange banks.27 2 A less precise kind of control over loans to single
borrowers is exercised by the Bank of Japan. It may use its "window
guidance" in operating its discount window to either encourage or discourage banks which use its facilities to fund international lending.273
2. CapitalAdequacy
Capital is defined as equity capital plus reserves for the purposes of capital

269. Japanese Banking Law, art. 19(1). In the matter of business reports, the Ministry of
Finance has been given wide discretion, Japanese Banking Law, art. 19(2). Japanese Banking
Law, art. 22, provides that matters to be contained in the business report are to be designated by
ordinance of the Ministry of Finance.
270. Japanese Banking Law, art. 21, states, however, that "a bank shall be under no
obligation to furnish information on such matters as will undermine financial order, disadvantage secrets of depositors and other customers, hamper banking operations unduly, or incur an
excessive burden of expenses for compilation." See FEDERATION REPORT, supra note 247, at 22.

271. Japanese Banking Law, art. 13(1).
272. FEDERATION REPORT, supra note 247, at 103; BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN,

supra note 140, at 60. Effective Mar. 31, 1987, the twenty percent limit will also apply to
branches of foreign banks. The limitation will be based on the bank's total capital and reserves
rather than that of the individual branch or branches. As applied to Japanese banks, both

administrative guidance and specific rules are generally based on worldwide consolidated
figures.
273. SPINDLER, supra note 42, at 104.
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adequacy assessment.27 4 In lieu of specific rules, the Ministry of Finance has
provided banks with administrative guidance that includes specific ratios.
For example, a bank's own capital should be greater than ten percent of total
deposits. 275 Fixed assets for business use are to be less than fifty percent of
net worth, and, if possible, below forty percent.276 The average ratio of
loans to deposits is to be below eighty percent.277 Finally, dividends are
generally limited to fifteen percent of equity capital and forty percent of
are
after-tax net income. 278 Such limitations on the payment of dividends
279
seen as a means of influencing the capital accumulation of banks.
The Ministry of Finance recently introduced a series of new guidelines on
overseas operations of Japanese banks, including a risk-asset ratio system
for their off balance sheet transactions. The introduction of a risk-asset ratio
requirement is being considered for 1986. However, Japanese regulators
must decide on detailed weightings of off balance sheet items before the
risk-asset ratio system is adopted.28 °
3. Liquidity
The Ministry of Finance has been encouraging banks to raise the ratio of
the average balance of current assets to total deposits to thirty percent or
more. The annual average of liquid assets (including cash, short-term interbank deposits and readily marketable securities) is to be at least thirty
percent of the annual average of total deposits. 281 Some special guidance has
been given with respect to banks' Eurocurrency operations. As of February
1983, 45 percent of term lending for one year or more was to be funded by
term deposits or other debt of over one year's maturity. The proportion of
borrowings with matching terms was set at fifteen percent for loans of longer
than three years. These guidelines have been applied to foreign branches
but not subsidiaries of Japanese banks.2 82 A factor which reduces mismatchof domestic
ing in the banking system as a whole is the concentration 283
banks.
trust
and
banks
credit
long-term
in
lending
long-term

274. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 113.
275. FEDERATION REPORT, supra note 247, at 106; BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN,

supra note 140, at 59.
276. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 59.
277. Id. This ratio has apparently been a source of some difficulty for Japanese banks. At

many times over the past twenty years, the ratio of loans to deposits has been consistently above
the standard. See also FEDERATION REPORT, supra note 247, at 106.
278. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 60.
279. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 113.
280. Japan Adopts New Overseas Guidelines, AM. BANKER, May 14, 1985, at 2.
281. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 59. DALE, BANK
SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 42; FEDERATION REPORT, supra note 247, at 106.
282. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 114.
283. Id.
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4. Foreign Exchange Exposure
The foreign currency operations of banks authorized to engage in foreign
exchange transactions are monitored through on-site unannounced examinations by the Ministry of Finance. In general terms, guidelines applicable on a daily basis are set by the Ministry of Finance for each bank's
net spot position in foreign exchange as well as for spot plus forward
positions. 284 Moreover, banks are required to report their positions monthly

with a breakdown into a number of major currencies. 285 There are further
guidelines with respect to the degree of mismatching that is permitted.286
While strict limits are not applied, banks generally keep their foreign
exchange exposure below ten percent of capital.287
C. SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING

1. Country Risk and Provisionsfor Loans Losses
Each Japanese bank is responsible for developing its own country risk
evaluation system. 288 The Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan view
the development of such a system as an integral part of a bank's conduct of
business and as an element which may be "guided" but not created by
supervisory authorities.2

89

The Japan Center for International Finance was

established in March 1983 for the purpose of providing information on
country risk to sponsoring banks.
While it disclaims any responsibility for developing country risk evaluation systems, the Ministry of Finance did issue administrative guidance in

early 1983 concerning the management of international activities. Japanese
banks were required by the terms of the directive to report in detail their
total exposure to major debtor countries on a consolidated semiannual
basis. Japanese banks were further advised to limit the size of their foreign
currency assets to fifteen times capital and to keep their interbank deposit
284. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 61.
285. R. Pecchioli, Regulations on Bank's Foreign Currency Ratios in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF BANKING: THE POLICY ISSUES, Annex 191 (OECD, 1983).
286. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 61.
287. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 114.

288. One bank outlined its system as including the following: "Research and analysis of the
conditions of each country; evaluation; establishment of lending policy and credit ceilings for
each country; control of credit balances extended." The system consists of the twice-yearly
evaluation of information about 106 countries, to each of which sovereign lending was expected
to exceed U.S. five million dollars annually. The system provides for the grading of countries
and the setting of absolute credit ceilings. Each country is given a grade of one to twenty-five by
plotting its GDP size against its rank (seventeen quantitative and nine qualitative factors). One
of twenty-five absolute credit ceilings is then assigned, corresponding to the determined grade.
Written statement and interview with senior officials of a major city bank, Tokyo, Japan (July

26, 1984) (notes on file with author).
289. The reasoning is that the Bank of Japan or the Ministry of Finance, as the case may be,
would have to assume responsibility for the failure of such risk evaluation systems if their
content was determined by supervisory authorities.
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claims as well as call loans in foreign currencies to within sixty percent of
their total foreign currency assets. Finally, Japanese banks were to set
up special provisions against loans to specified "financially troubled"
countries. 290 While total loan loss reserves were not to exceed five percent of
a bank's loan portfolio, a figure as high as fifty percent may be applicable to
loans for individual countries.
The Ministry of Finance has further developed specific guidelines for
international lending. Such matters as the percentage of new international
loans relative to all syndicated loans, the percentage of such lending to be
directed to developing countries, the maximum participation of Japanese
banks in individual syndications and the size of spreads have been the
subject of directives by the Ministry of Finance. 29 '
In January of 1984, the Ministry of Finance stated that Japanese banks
would be allowed to make a tax-free provision for rescheduled loans and
new money advanced to problem countries after April 1, 1984. The maximum tax-free provision was to be one percent of a bank's exposure to a
particular country. The new tax position was said by one observer to be a
political move to encourage Japanese banks to continue lending at a time
when new bank loans were essential to save major Latin American
debtors. 292 "Hidden reserves" may no longer be used by Japanese banks in
determining their provisions for loan losses. Formerly, the Ministry of
Finance restricted the overstatement of profits but permitted banks293to
maintain more reserves than were allowed for ordinary corporations.
2. Lender of Last Report
The Bank of Japan essentially views its lender of last resort function as
extending to liquidity matters only. 2 9 4 However, there is a statutory basis for
intervention in the event of either solvency or liquidity crisis of a generalized
nature. Article 25 of the Bank of Japan Law permits the Bank of Japan to
290. Interview with senior officials of Ministry of Finance (July 19, 1984) (notes on file with
author); BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supra note 140, at 60-61. The so-called

"provisions for specific overseas loans" were to be included in the figure of loan loss provisions
in the income statement and in the total of loan loss reserves on the balance sheet for a
description of requirements prior to the issuance of the 1983 directive on country risk exposure,
see Pecchioli, supra note 285, at 90; DALE, BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 62, at 43; and DALE,
INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 114.
291. DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 105, at 115.

292. Lascelles, Foreign Lending Spurfor Japanese Banks, Fin. Times, Jan. 20, 1984, at 30.
293. Ichikawa, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL BANK AccOUNTING, supra note 115, at 261. The

Ministry of Finance in a Sept. 1967 administrative circular provided that ircome and expenses
must be recorded accurately on an accrual basis. Depreciation and provisions for loan losses
were to be accounted for uniformly by all banks and not accounted for by the bank's own
judgment.

294. The Bank of Japan also expects that its lender of last resort function would be exercised
only in yen. Of course, if a Japanese bank experiences liquidity problems in a foreign currency,
the Bank of Japan could make yen available for conversion into a foreign currency.
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make loans to Japanese banks on special terms if they
are "necessary for the
295
maintenance and fostering of the credit system."
3. Treatment of Branches and Subsidiaries
of Japanese Banks OperatingAbroad
Supervision of Japanese banks, whether exercised by the Bank of Japan
or Ministry of Finance, is based on consolidated accounts.296 All Japanese
commercial banks conduct foreign lending activities of significance from
headquarters in Japan. In the past, however, there was some possibility that
lending activities of locally incorporated subsidiaries in which Japanese
banks had a substantial but not a majority interest could escape control by
headquarters. However, the 1981 amendments to the Japanese Banking
Law provided that approval of the Ministry of Finance would be needed if a
bank wished to acquire a percentage above a specified threshold of shares of
a company that would engage in banking activities in a foreign country.297
More recently, the desirability of supervising banks on a consolidated basis
has been accepted by Japanese supervisory authorities. The Banking
Bureau's prudential bank examinations, for example, would include foreign
branches of Japanese banks.
4. Treatment of Foreign Banks Operating in Japan
In theory, the Japanese Banking Law is to apply to foreign banks in the
same manner that it applies to Japanese banks. However, as stated in the
Federation Report, "[in actual application of the law, the principle of
reciprocity with the country from which the foreign bank comes will be given
importance more than anything else." ' 298 Until recently, there were no
subsidiaries of foreign banks in Japan. In order for a foreign bank to operate
a subsidiary, approval was required from appropriate government authorities under the Anti-Monopoly Law, the Banking Law and the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. Obtaining approval under all of
these laws was said to be almost impossible in practice. 299 In 1985, foreign
banks were allowed to open branch offices in Japan for their securities
295. BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF TEN, supranote 140, at 63; Bank of Japan Law, art.

25, states that: "The Bank of Japan may, with the permission of the competent Minister,
undertake such businesses as are necessary for the fostering of the credit system."
296. Wholly-owned and majority-owned subsidiaries are included in such consolidated
accounts and some progress has been made in extending the scope of consolidation to foreign
affiliates. The requirement that banks prepare financial statements on a consolidated basis
dates back to Oct. 30, 1976, when Ministerial Ordinance No. 30 was promulgated. Beginning
Apr. 1, 1977, all companies whose stock was listed on the stock exchange were required to
prepare consolidated financial statements.
297. Japanese Banking Law, art. 9(1).
298. FEDERATION REPORT, supra note 247, at 17.
299. Ichikawa, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL BANK ACCOUNTING, supra note 115, at 258.
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subsidiaries, as long as the capital stake of the parent bank and its affiliates
remained under fifty percent.30 0
Approximately seventy-five branches of foreign banks have been licensed
by the Ministry of Finance under Article 47 of the Banking Law to conduct a
banking business. While reciprocity considerations appear to be most important in determining whether or not to grant a license to a branch, certain
other factors are also considered by the Ministry of Finance: (a) financial
strength, credit status, and size of the bank; (b) the length of time for which
the foreign bank has had a representative office in Japan, and (c) the impact
of the proposed branch on Japanese financial institutions. Article 48 of the
Japanese Banking Law provides broad discretion in the exercise of the
supervisory role of the Ministry of Finance. Such reports on the activities or
position of a branch of a foreign bank as the Ministry of Finance deems
necessary for the sound and appropriate management of the foreign bank's
branch may be required.30 1
While providing ample room for comprehensive supervision by the Ministry of Finance, the current provisions of the Japanese Banking Law represent a liberalization of past provisions. Differential operating regulations,
including restraints on soliciting local deposits and authorization requirements applicable to making yen-dominated loans to nonresidents, have
been removed.3 02
5. Attitudes Towards International Cooperation

The global debt crisis has led to a sense that greater international commitments will be required in the future at both the commercial bank and
supervisory levels. One token of this attitude is that Japan is now the second
largest contributor to the World Bank. Japanese commercial banks and
bank supervisory authorities express a willingness to work towards greater
cooperation in resolving the LDC debt crisis. However, it is commonly
acknowledged that progress must first be made in the liberalization of
Japanese domestic financial markets.

Editor'snote: PartII, to be published in the next issue of THE INTERNATIONAL
LAWYER (volume 20, number 1) will include analyses of the regulation and
supervision of bank lending in the creditorcountriesof France, Belgium, The
Netherlands and Switzerland. Suggestions for reform will also be offered.

300. Japan Allowing Securities Subsidiaries, AM. BANKER, June 13, 1985, at 2.
301. Japanese Banking Law, art. 48(2).
302. Pecchioli, supra note 285, at 187; see, generally, A. Mitchell, Foreign Investment in
Japan, INT'L. L. BULL. Spring 1984, at 47.
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